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Statement of Disclaimer
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as fulfillment of the
course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course requirements does not imply
technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this report is done at the risk of the user.
These risks may include, but may not be limited to, catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of
patent or copyright laws. California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot
be held liable for any use or misuse of the project.

Keywords: Hospital Fire Protection Engineering, Hospital Life Safety Code, Hospital Performance-Based
Design, Hospital Smoke Control, Hospital Fire Modeling (Fire Dynamics Simulator FDS, CONTAM,
DETACT, Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport CFAST, Pathfinder, PyroSim).
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Abstract
Summary
This report examines the Baylor, Scott & White Medical Center in College Station, TX. This
hospital is a 324,070 square feet midrise building of Type I-A construction and Group I-2 occupancy, with
a basement and five above-grade floors. Publicly-available, simplified floorplans were obtained from the
internet, and a prescriptive- and performance-based analysis was formed around these plans. It should
be noted that these online plans may not contain all information and details in that are found in
architectural plans, and that assumptions were made in order to ‘fill in the gaps’ and proceed with this
report. For example, on the basement floorplan, only one vertical exit is shown, and in this report it is
assumed no other vertical exits are present, though in reality there may be. Such assumptions are noted
at the time they are presented within this report.
This report includes a prescriptive-based analysis of the fire and life safety components of this
building, which includes the egress, water-based fire suppression, detection and notification, structural,
flammability assessment method, and smoke control systems. The prescriptive-based analysis is based
on the IBC and associated NFPA standards, as adopted by the AHJ in the area. It is understood that as a
health care facility, requirements and surveys by the Joint Commission (formerly Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, JCAHO, and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
JCAH) apply, in addition to those by AHJ’s to other facilities and occupancies. However, the Joint
Commission requirements are outside the scope of this report, and the report instead focuses on the
focus on the IBC and NFPA standards.
This reports also includes a performance-based analysis of this building. The performance-based
analysis considers two design fires based on data from the SFPE Handbook, 5th edition: an office
workstation fire, and a patient bed fire. Pathfinder models with patient beds requiring assistance to
move was used to estimate the required safe egress time (RSET) to evacuate from one smoke
compartment to another via horizontal exits for each scenario. FDS models were then used to find the
available safe egress time (ASET) based on tenability criteria.

Results
From the prescriptive-based analysis, and based on assumptions made in this report, the Baylor,
Scott & White Medical Center generally meets code requirements. One example where this is not the
case is in the number of exits provided from the basement level to the level of discharge on the ground
floor. As noted in the summary though, another vertical exit may be present, but not shown on these
simplified floorplans. Additionally, the assumptions made as to the occupancy classification and loads
for spaces in the basement were deliberately chosen to be conservative, and in reality the occupant load
may be below the threshold for two separate exits.
From the performance-based analysis, an ASET of over 500 seconds was calculated for the office
fire scenario, which is greater than an RSET of 315.5 seconds for that scenario. However, an ASET of 260
seconds was calculated for the bedroom fire scenario, which is less than the RSET for that scenario.
Additional examination of the model with stakeholders, including the AHJ and hospital, should be
conducted to verify assumptions and data. In case RSET still exceeds ASET, additional engineered
systems or administrative controls can be implemented to increase ASET until it exceeds RSET, including
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increases in detection, notification, suppression, smoke control, flammability limits on fixtures,
furnishings, and equipment, etc.
It should be noted that both the office and bedroom fire scenarios were based on a sprinklercontrolled fire, and several assumptions regarding the overall HRR curve, reaction chemistry, and other
factors which may be further refined. The fact that the calculations assumed that the doors to the office
and the bedroom were open during each fire scenario likely was a key component of these model
calculations, and bares further examination.

Conclusions
This report serves as an academic analysis of the Baylor, Scott & White Medical Center in
College Station, TX. While lack of detailed drawings and information necessarily make this report limited
in use, it is hoped this paper serves as a basic review of the life safety systems of this hospital, and
hospitals in general. It is also anticipated that this narrative may serve as a starting point for future
detailed studies.
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Introduction
This report examines the Baylor Scott & White Medical Center from under both a prescriptive
code analysis and a performance-based analysis. The approach taken in this report is a simple one by
choice, reflecting the author’s lack of experience in this field. It is likely another engineer can identify
improvements to the analysis conducted here. However, it is hoped that this paper demonstrates sound
engineering judgement, as well as a basic understanding of the principals of fire protection engineering.
Note, details on the codes used as references—full names, code cycle year, etc.—are listed in
the “References” section of this report. This report uses a shorthand when referring to them in the main
body of this work. For example, when referring to Section 308.3.1.2 of the 2018 edition of the
International Building Code, it is abbreviated in this report as 308.3.1.2 IBC.

Building Description
The Baylor Scott & White Medical Center is a hospital located at 700 Scott and White Drive,
College Station, TX 77845. It was constructed six years ago in 2013 as part of Scott & White Healthcare
for $90MM, and was originally called the Scott & White Medical Center. The same year construction on
this hospital was completed, Scott & White Healthcare combined with the Baylor Health Care System to
form Baylor Scott & White, which is the largest nonprofit healthcare system in Texas. The building was
accordingly rebadged with the new, longer title of Baylor Scott & White in 2016.
This facility has a basement and five above-ground floors with an area of 324,070 square feet.
This report assumes that each floor is self-contained, and there are no interior atriums or openings
between floors. From the publicly-available plans, a natural lightwell is present between the 3rd and 5th
floors, and there is an opening above the cafeteria, connecting Floor 1 with part of Floor 2. From
satellite imagery of the building, it is assumed that the natural lightwell is open to the sky at the roof
line. It is further assumed that both the natural light well and the cafeteria space are separated from
floors 3 through 5 and Floor 2 respectively with appropriate barriers, such fire-rated glass walls. Note,
sprinkler-protected glass walls are also possible, though if such a design is used for the building, the
sprinkler design presented in this report may need to be modified to ensure an adequate level of
sprinkler protection is provided for the glass. All of the assumptions regarding atriums should be
confirmed with the Architect and Client. Under these assumptions, this report finds that there are no
atriums or openings between floors under the definition of atriums under IBC Chapter 2, and that the
provisions of atriums under IBC Section 404 do not apply to this building.
Assuming 12 feet per story and level surroundings, the highest occupied floor is located 48 feet
above the lowest level of fire department access, and so it falls below the 75 feet requirement for a
high-rise building classification as defined in the Chapter 2 of the IBC. Even considering the potential for
a roof deck and conservative interpretation by the authority having jurisdiction, that would only
increase the height of the highest occupied floor to 60 feet, and so it would still not be classified as a
high-rise.

Building Function
Baylor Scott & White Medical Center is a 324,070 square feet hospital with 143 inpatient beds
on a 98-acre campus. The hospital offers several services, including a laboratory, pharmacy, emergency
room, surgery, labor and delivery, office, classrooms, and conference rooms. While the hospital falls
under occupancy classification Institutional Group I-2 Condition 2 (308.3.1.2 IBC), there are several other
8

uses in various spaces of this building. It may be best classified as primarily a hospital, with a mixed-use
occupancy, and this report will examine this in greater detail during an occupancy analysis in the egress
portion of the prescriptive analysis.

Pictures
Figures 1 through 6 show maps and pictures of the Baylor Scott & White Medical Center.

Figure # 1. Map of Texas, Showing Relative Location of Baylor Scott & White
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Figure # 2. Map of College Town, TX, Showing Relative Location of Baylor Scott & White
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Figure # 3. Satellite View of College Town, TX, Showing Relative Location of Baylor Scott & White
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Figure # 4. Satellite View of the Baylor Scott & White Medical Center and Campus
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Figure # 5. Architectural Rendering of Baylor Scott & White

Figure # 6. Ground View of Baylor Scott & White

Floorplans
Below are floorplans for Baylor Scott & White. Note, these floorplans are publicly available on
the internet. More information on these floorplans and their scaling can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure # 7. Basement Floorplan
The Basement floorplan, Figure 7, shows that Environmental Services/Maintenance, a
Laboratory, Pharmacy, and Crawl Space make up the bulk of the floor.
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Figure # 8. Floor 1 Floorplan
The Floor One floorplan, Figure 8, show several features on the first floor, including dining
rooms, lobby, registration, emergency room suite, x-ray rooms, electrocardiogram rooms, ultrasound
rooms, nuclear medicine rooms, and magnetic resonance imaging rooms.
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Figure # 9. Floor 2 Floorplan
The Floor Two floorplan, Figure 9, shows operating rooms, waiting areas, pre- and postoperation rooms, an intensive care unit, and a catheterization laboratory and endoscopy suite.
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Figure # 10. Floor 3 Floorplan
The Floor Three floorplan, Figure 10, shows labor and delivery and recovery rooms, waiting
areas, a newborn nursery, Caesarean section rooms, and neonatal intensive care unit.
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Figure # 11. Floor 4 Floorplan
The Floor Four floorplan, Figure 11, shows medical surgical rooms.
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Figure # 12. Floor 5 Floorplan
The Floor Five floorplan, Figure 12, shows rooms that are shelled for expansion, classrooms, risk
management rooms, and a medical records room.

Report
This report will show a prescriptive analysis and performance-based analysis of the Baylor Scott
& White Medical Center. During these analysis, various aspects of fire protection engineering will be
examined in either in one section (such as egress in prescriptive and design fire in performance-based)
or both sections (such as flammability assessment and smoke control).
All information and the assumptions contained abstract and introduction hold true for the main
body of the report. Following the prescriptive and performance-based analysis, the report will present
conclusions and recommendations for any deficiencies found. Finally, the report contains both the
reference and appendix sections.

Prescriptive Analysis
This report includes a prescriptive analysis of the building’s fire and life safety features, to verify
that implicit safety is achieved in the design of this hospital. The prescriptive analysis includes examining
the egress, suppression, alarms, structural, flammability assessment, and smoke control components.
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To find the applicable codes for this building, research was conducted to find what codes and
standards the AHJ’s for this facility have adopted. College Station is a city in Texas, and is located
between Dallas, Austin, and Houston; it is 175 miles from Dallas, 107 miles from Austin, and 97 miles
from Houston. Texas has adopted the International Code Council’s standards (or I-codes), as well as the
National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) standards directly. The adoption of the I-codes and NFPA
standards is in contrast to a state like California, which has built upon the model I-codes to create the
California Building Code, California Fire Code, etc. College Station itself has adopted the ICC and NFPA
standards, and are on a more current code cycle than the state is using. A list of the applicable
references at the time of this report can be found in “References.”

Performance-based Analysis
This report includes a performance-based analysis of the building’s fire and life safety features
to verify that explicit safety is achieved in the design of this hospital. The objective will be life safety, and
the report uses tenability criteria to compare the available safe egress time (ASET) to the required safe
egress time (RSET) for occupants. The calculation of ASET and RSET includes examining design fires, fire
models, flammability assessment, and smoke control components.
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Prescriptive Analysis
Egress
Introduction
The egress for this project is analyzed with respect to the 2018 edition of NFPA 101: Life Safety
Code and the 2018 International Building Code. This report also references the 5th Edition of the SFPE
Handbook, and material from the Cal Poly SLO FPE Program. The prescriptive analysis first presents all of
the vertical and horizontal exits in the building.

Body
Exits
The vertical and horizontal exits are shown on the following figures (Figures # 13 – 18). Note, the
horizontal exits are in the fire barriers that divide each floor into two smoke compartments, as required
by code (407.5 IBC). The requirements for exits—such as total number of exits, separation distance,
etc.—from IBC Chapter 10 are satisfied. Related details and calculations are shown below in this
“Egress” subsection.
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Figure # 13. Basement Exits
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Figure # 14. Floor 1 Exits
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Figure # 15. Floor 2 Exits
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Figure # 16. Floor 3 Exits
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Figure # 17. Floor 4 Exits
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Figure # 18. Floor 5 Exits
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Occupancy Classifications and Characteristics
A color-coded floor plan of the hospital is shown below in Figures # 19 – 24. It uses different
colors to distinguish between each different occupancy classification. Of particular note is blue for exit
access, green for vertical exits, and grey for service spaces (such as elevators, restrooms, electrical and
telecommunication rooms, mechanical rooms, etc.).
In selecting the occupancy, some engineering judgement is required. The report used the
material from Cal Poly SLO’s FPE program and Chapter 6 of the 2018 LSC in determining the occupancy
of each space. While some classifications were straightforward, in other cases some engineering
judgement was required because of several valid possibilities. Where engineering judgement was
required, the more conservative option was selected to account for a ‘worst case’ scenario. The choice
of occupancy can and should be revisited once more detailed plans are available.
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Figure # 19. Basement Occupancy Classifications
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Figure # 20. Floor 1 Occupancy Classifications
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Figure # 21. Floor 2 Occupancy Classifications
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Figure # 22. Floor 3 Occupancy Classifications
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Figure # 23. Floor 4 Occupancy Classifications
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Figure # 24. Floor 5 Occupancy Classifications
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Occupant Load Calculations
Using the occupancy drawings above, the occupant load of each floor/space is calculated using
methods from Cal Poly SLO’s FPE program and the 2018 LSC.
A summary is shown here in Table # 1, with more detailed calculations and references below in
Tables # 2 – 7. Note, an excess number of significant figures is shown in the following tables, and in
those later in the report; they are included to demonstrate that minimal rounding is used in
intermediate calculations, until they are rounded up or down as appropriate for the final results.
Table # 1. Building Occupant Load
FLOOR
OCCUPANCY
Basement
76
1st
903
2nd
595
3rd
681
4th
451
5th
927
Total
3633
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Table # 2. Basement Occupant Load Calculations

Use
Office

Area
(ft^2)

Table 7.3.1.2
Use

2700.583 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
0 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
10802.33 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
0 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
0 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, In
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
5401.167 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
0 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
0 fixed seating
Service Space 35107.58 N/A
Total

Occupant Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)

Estimated
Estimated Net Applicable Area for Occupant Load
Area Multiplier Calculations (ft^2) (persons)

150 gross

N/A

2700.583333

18.00388889
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120 gross

N/A

0

0

0

240 gross
N/A
Use number of
fixed seats
N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; > 450 ft^2,
15 gross
N/A

10802.33333

45.00972222

46

0

0

0

0

0

0

500 gross

5401.166667

10.80233333

11

0.8

0

0

0

0.9

0
35107.58333

0
0

0
0
76

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

An occupant load of 76 is calculated for the basement.
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Occupant Load,
Rounded Up
(persons)

Table # 3. Floor 1 Occupant Load Calculations

Use
Office

Area
(ft^2)

Table 7.3.1.2
Use

10802.33 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
0 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
10802.33 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
2700.583 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
5401.167 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, In
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
2700.583 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
10802.33 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
2700.583 fixed seating
Service Space 8101.75 N/A
Total

Occupant Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)

Estimated
Estimated Net Applicable Area for Occupant Load
Area Multiplier Calculations (ft^2) (persons)

150 gross

N/A

10802.33333

72.01555556

73

120 gross

N/A

0

0

0

240 gross
N/A
Use number of
fixed seats
N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; > 450 ft^2,
15 gross
N/A

10802.33333

45.00972222

46

100

100

100

5401.166667

180.0388889

181

500 gross

2700.583333

5.401166667

6

0.5

5401.166667

360.0777778

361

0.75

2025.4375
8101.75

135.0291667
0

136
0
903

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

An occupant load of 903 is calculated for the first floor.
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Occupant Load,
Rounded Up
(persons)

Table # 4. Floor 2 Occupancy Load Calculations

Use
Office

Area
(ft^2)

Table 7.3.1.2
Use

5401.167 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
5401.167 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
18904.08 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
10802.33 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
2700.583 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, In
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
2700.583 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
0 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
2700.583 fixed seating
Service Space 5401.167 N/A
Total

Occupant Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)

Estimated
Estimated Net Applicable Area for Occupant Load
Area Multiplier Calculations (ft^2) (persons)

150 gross

N/A

5401.166667

36.00777778
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120 gross

N/A

5401.166667

45.00972222

46

240 gross
N/A
Use number of
fixed seats
N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; > 450 ft^2,
15 gross
N/A

18904.08333

78.76701389

79

200

200

200

2700.583333

90.01944444

91

500 gross

2700.583333

5.401166667

6

0.5

0

0

0

0.75

2025.4375
5401.166667

135.0291667
0

136
0
595

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

An occupant load of 595 is calculated for the second floor.
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Occupant Load,
Rounded Up
(persons)

Table # 5. Floor 3 Occupancy Load Calculations

Use
Office

Area
(ft^2)

Table 7.3.1.2
Use

5401.167 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
8101.75 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
16203.5 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
5401.167 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
5401.167 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, In
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
2700.583 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
0 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
5401.167 fixed seating
Service Space 5401.167 N/A
Total

Occupant Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)

Estimated
Estimated Net Applicable Area for Occupant Load
Area Multiplier Calculations (ft^2) (persons)

150 gross

N/A

5401.166667

36.00777778

37

120 gross

N/A

8101.75

67.51458333

68

240 gross
N/A
Use number of
fixed seats
N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; > 450 ft^2,
15 gross
N/A

16203.5

67.51458333

68

50

50

50

5401.166667

180.0388889

181

500 gross

2700.583333

5.401166667

6

0.5

0

0

0

0.75

4050.875
5401.166667

270.0583333
0

271
0
681

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

An occupant load of 681 is calculated for the third floor.
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Occupant Load,
Rounded Up
(persons)

Table # 6. Floor 4 Occupancy Load Calculations
Area
Table 7.3.1.2
Use
(ft^2)
Use
Office
5041.167 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
21604.67 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
0 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
0 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
2700.583 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, in
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
2700.583 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
0 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
2700.583 fixed seating
Service Space 18904.08 N/A
Total

Occupat Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)
150 gross

Estimated Net Estimated
Occupant Load,
Area
Applicable Area for Occupant Load Rounded Up
Multiplier
Calculations (ft^2) (persons)
(persons)
N/A
5401.166667
36.00777778
37

120 gross

N/A

21604.16667

180.0347222

181

240 gross
N/A
Use number
of fixed seats N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; >450
ft^2, 15 gross N/A

0

0

0

0

0

0

2700.583333

90.01944443

91

500 gross

2700.583333

5.401166666

6

0.5

0

0

0

0.75

2025.4375
10802.3333

135.0291667
0

136
0
451

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

An occupant load of 451 is calculated for the fourth floor.
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Table # 7. Floor 5 Occupancy Load Calculations

Use
Office

Area
(ft^2)

Table 7.3.1.2
Use

5401.167 Business Use
Health Care
Use, Sleeping
Bed
13502.92 departments
Health Care
Use, Inpatient
treatment
Medical
0 departments
Assembly Use,
Waiting
0 Fixed seating
Business Use,
Collaboration
Business
10802.33 rooms/spaces
Storage Use, In
other than
storage and
mercantile
Storage
5401.167 occupancies
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Dining
0 fixed seating
Assembly Use,
Less
concentrated
use, without
Assembly
8101.75 fixed seating
Service Space 10802.33 N/A
Total

Occupant Load
Factor
(ft^2/person)

Estimated
Estimated Net Applicable Area for Occupant Load
Area Multiplier Calculations (ft^2) (persons)

150 gross

N/A

5401.166667

36.00777778

37

120 gross

N/A

13502.91667

112.5243056

113

240 gross
N/A
Use number of
fixed seats
N/A
<= 450 ft^2, 30
gross; > 450 ft^2,
15 gross
N/A

0

0

0

0

0

0

10802.33333

360.0777778

361

500 gross

5401.166667

10.80233333

11

0.5

0

0

0

0.75

6076.3125
10802.33333

405.0875
0

405
0
927

N/A

15 net

15 net
N/A

N/A

Occupant Load,
Rounded Up
(persons)

An occupant load of 927 is calculated for the fifth floor.
Exit Capacity Calculations and Number and Arrangement of Means of Egress
The egress capacity of each floor is calculated using methods from Cal Poly SLO’s FPE program
and the 2018 LSC. The report then compares this number to the expected occupant load to determine if
the exit capacities are adequate for each floor.
The egress capacity is found based on the following assumptions:
The aisles, corridors, and ramps are 8 feet in clear and unobstructed width (18.2.3.4 NFPA 101).
Cross-corridor door openings have a clear width of 6 feet 11 inches for pairs of doors and 41-1/2
inches for single doors (18.2.3.4 (6) NFPA 101).
Egress doors, including stairway doors, are a minimum of 41-1/2 inches (18.2.3.6 NFPA 101), and
are assumed to be 42 inches for construction and calculations.
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Because of the total cumulative occupant load assigned to the stairs, the load of the 2nd – 5th
floors divided by 3 would be far below 2000 persons (and this is true when assigning the basement
occupant load to one of the three stairs). For this reason, this building would only need 44 inch stairs by
Table 7.2.2.2.1.2(B) NFPA 101. However, when using this stair width with 42 inch doors, this report finds
that it is a significant limiting factor. If the calculations instead use 56 inch wide stairs, the egress
capacity for the stairs and doors are much more similar; the stairs are still the limiting factor, but only by
a few people. Additionally, the calculations show that even with this increase in stair widths, there is still
insufficient egress for some floors, so it seems prudent to try to increase the egress capacity as much as
possible. Finally, the 56 inch stairs seem to ‘fit’ the drawings, and assuming the drawings are to scale,
this would also be another reasons to support using these larger stairs. For that reason, the report
assumes that the stairs will be 56 inches wide.
A summary is shown here in Table # 8, with more detailed calculations and references below.
Note, egress from the first floor (the ground floor) is assumed to take place using all the exits along the
perimeter of the building, not including the three staircases.
Table # 8. Exit Capacity Summary
EGRESS
FLOOR
OCCUPANCY CAPACITY
Basement
76 201, OK
1st
903 3741, OK
2nd
595 603, OK
3rd
681 603, NOT OK
4th
451 603, OK
5th
927 603, NOT OK
Exit Capacity from Each Floor/Space
The report now exams the egress capacity calculations for each floor in more detail.
Table # 9. Basement Exit Capacity Calculation

Exit
Main (Western)

Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)
56

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stair
Door
Effective
Stairways,
Doorways,
Egress
Egress
Egress
width/person (in) width/person (in) Capacity Capacity Capacity
146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218
0.2 201.7459
210
201

Total

201

The calculations from Table # 9 show an egress capacity of 201 for the basement. Compared to
the occupant load of 76 for the basement, there is sufficient egress capacity. Note, if this report used 44
inch wide stairs, the egress capacity would not be sufficient.
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Table # 10. Floor 1 Exit Capacity Calculation

Exit

Main (Western)

Doors (5)

Next to stairs (1)
Total

Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stairways,
Doorways,
width/person (in) width/person (in)

Stair
Door
Effective
Egress
Egress
Egress
Capacity Capacity Capacity

56

146.7+(Wn408 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

2040

2040

56

146.7+(Wn60 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

300

1500

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201
3741

The calculations from Table # 10 show an egress capacity of 3741 for the first floor. Compared to
the occupant load of 903 for the first, there is sufficient egress capacity. Note, this report uses the seven
exits along the perimeter of the building in this calculation, and assume no occupants exit through the
two stairwells along the east side of the building.
Table # 11. Floor 2 Exit Capacity Calculation
Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)

Main (Western)

56

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stair
Door
Effective
Stairways,
Doorways,
Egress
Egress
Egress
width/person (in) width/person (in) Capacity Capacity Capacity
146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218
0.2 201.7459
210
201

Northeast

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Southeast

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Exit

Total

603

The calculations from Table # 11 show egress capacity of 603 for the second floor. Compared to
the occupant load of 595 for the second floor, there is sufficient egress capacity.
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Table # 12. Floor 3 Exit Capacity Calculation

Exit
Main (Western)

Northeast

Southeast

Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)
56

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stair
Door
Effective
Stairways,
Doorways,
Egress
Egress
Egress
width/person (in) width/person (in) Capacity Capacity Capacity
146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218
0.2 201.7459
210
201

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Total

603

The calculations from Table # 12 show an egress capacity of 603 for the third floor. Compared to
the occupant load of 681 for the third floor, there is not sufficient egress capacity. This deficiency is
primarily caused by the assembly and business spaces on the third floor, which, at 271 and 181
occupants respectively, consist of over 66 percent of the total occupant load of 681 of that floor. It is
recommended that some of the assembly and business spaces be converted to other uses, such as office
space or medical space, until the point where the egress capacity of the floor is greater than its
occupant load. Alternatively, some AHJ’s have allowed the use of horizontal exits to increase the exit
capacity (and thus the allowable occupant load) of a floor. It should be confirmed whether or not this is
an option for this project.
Table # 13. Floor 4 Exit Capacity Calculation
Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)

Main (Western)

56

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stair
Door
Effective
Stairways,
Doorways,
Egress
Egress
Egress
width/person (in) width/person (in) Capacity Capacity Capacity
146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218
0.2 201.7459
210
201

Northeast

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Southeast

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Exit

Total

603

The calculations from Table # 13 show an egress capacity of 603 for the fourth floor. Compared
to the occupant load of 216 for the fourth floor, there is sufficient egress capacity.
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Table # 14. Floor 5 Exit Capacity Calculation
Stairway Door
width
width
(in.)
(in)

Exit
Main (Western)

Northeast

Southeast

56

Capacity Factor, Capacity Factor,
Stair
Door
Effective
Stairways,
Doorways,
Egress
Egress
Egress
width/person (in) width/person (in) Capacity Capacity Capacity
146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218
0.2 201.7459
210
201

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

56

146.7+(Wn42 44)/0.218

0.2 201.7459

210

201

Total

603

The calculations for Table # 14 show an egress capacity of 603 for the fifth floor. Compared to
the occupant load of 927 for the fifth floor, there is not sufficient egress capacity. This deficiency is
primarily caused by the assembly and business spaces on the fourth floor, which, at 405 and 361
occupants respectively, consist of over 82 percent of the total occupant load of 927 of that floor. It is
recommended that some of the assembly and business spaces be converted to other uses, such as office
space or medical space, until the point where the egress capacity of the floor is greater than its
occupant load. Alternatively, some AHJ’s have allowed the use of horizontal exits to increase the exit
capacity (and thus the allowable occupant load) of a floor. It should be confirmed whether or not this is
an option for this project.
Additionally, since corridors are 8 feet wide, or 96 inches, the corridor width equates to a
corridor egress capacity of 385 persons. Comparing this to the occupancies and number of exits, the
calculations show that the corridor egress capacity is more than sufficient even for the first and fifth
floors, the floors with the highest occupancy loads.
Number of Exits
This report expands on the work on egress capacities above, and next analyzes if the number of
exits is sufficient. The primary reference for this will be 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 NFPA 101, and what was
presented in the Cal Poly FPE program.
Table # 15. Number of Exit Summary
FLOOR
Basement
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

OCCUPANCY
76
903
595
681
451
927

EGRESS CAPACITY
201, OK
3741, OK
603, OK
603, NOT OK
603, OK
603, NOT OK
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NUMBER OF EXITS
1, NOT OK
7, OK
3, OK
3, OK
3, OK
3, OK

Table # 15 shows that all floors except for the basement have an adequate number of exits.
Because the basement has over 50 occupants, it should have two exits, but only has one. Additionally,
under 18.2.4.2, each story should have at least two exists, and the basement does not satisfy this
requirement.
Arrangements of Exits
The report expands on the work on egress capacities and number of exits to next analyze if the
exit arrangement is satisfactory. The report considers 2018 LSC references such as 7.5.1.1, 7.5.1.1.1,
7.5.1.1.4, 7.5.1.3, 7.5.1.3.1, 7.5.1.3.2, etc. (more references below), and the material discussed in the Cal
Poly FPE program to determine if the arrangement of exits is appropriate. Most spaces have multiple
exits that obviously meet the ½ diagonal minimum as set forth in IBC Section 1007.1.1. The exit
separation distance is confirmed because when exits are at two ends of the longer wall of its rectangular
perimeter. Secondary analysis confirms these measurements by hand, using a protractor to measure the
distance between exits, and comparing this to half of the diagonal. Alternatively, the distance separation
calculation can also be accomplished by comparing the length of the line between the exits and half of
the diagonal (note that this can be done manually by hand or digitally via computer). At this point, in the
absence of information about the fixtures and furniture in each space, this report assumes that a
straight path between each exit is possible, so a direct path between exits as both a possible and
probable option.
Additionally, under 18.2.4.3 of the 2018 LSC, new health care facilities should have at least two
exits accessible on each floor, and it should be noted that all floors except the basement are able to
meet this requirement.
Table # 16. Arrangement of Exit Summary
EGRESS
NUMBER OF
FLOOR
OCCUPANCY CAPACITY
EXITS
Basement
76 201, OK
1, NOT OK
1st
903 3741, OK
7, OK
2nd
595 603, OK
3, OK
3rd
681 603, NOT OK
3, OK
4th
451 603, OK
3, OK
5th
927 603, NOT OK
3, OK

EXIT
ARRANGEMENT
NOT OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK

Regulatory Requirements for Egress Systems
Horizontal Exits
Horizontal exits for this hospital are governed by several parts of the 2018 LSC (detailed
references below). There is no requirement that horizontal exits be required, but horizontal exits
complying with 7.2.4 NFPA 101 ‘shall be permitted’ by 18.2.2.5 NFPA 101.
Based on the simplified floorplans used for the report have, horizontal exits that are used in the
building cannot be positively identified, but it is assumed to be highly likely that they are present, given
the ‘total concept’ of a health care facility in minimizing the possibility of a fire emergency requiring the
evacuation of occupants (18.1.1.3, 18.1.1.3.1, 18.1.1.3.2 NFPA 101).
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The requirements for smoke barriers to divide every story into two or more smoke
compartments (407.5 IBC) lends itself to the placement of horizontal exits on each story. It is anticipated
that horizontal exists will coincide with the requirements for subdivision and smoke barriers for health
care facilities, in that the horizontal exists will be present between smoke compartments (18.3.7,
18.3.7.1 NFPA 101). With this in mind, the report has shown horizontal exits along with vertical exits on
floorplans earlier in this report.
Note, while the number of horizontal exits are generally limited to one-half the total number of
exits on a floor (1026.1 IBC), an exception for Group I-2 occupancies permit horizontal exits to comprise
two-thirds of the required exits from any building or floor area.
Fire Resistance Ratings for Corridors and Stairways in the Building
Because the stairways in the hospital connect 5 or more floors, they require a 2-hour fire
resistance rating per 7.1.3.2.1 of the 2018 LSC.
One would expect a 1-hour fire resistance rating for the corridors under 7.1.3.1 NFPA 101. For
the corridors, 18.3.6.2.2 from Chapter 18 NFPA 101 for new health care occupancies construction states
that no fire resistance rating shall be required for corridor walls. However, there are mixed occupancies
in this hospital, and so may require 1-hour fire resistance rating in accordance with Section 8.3 for
certain hazardous areas by 18.3.2.1.2 NFPA 101, or even 2-hour fire resistance rating in accordance with
Chapter 8 for other occupancies by 18.1.3.4 NFPA 101. Rather than try to selectively use 1-hour and 2hour fire resistance ratings for the corridors in certain places where the corridor borders an occupancy
that requires that level of protection (and having to remodel them if occupancies change in the future),
this report recommends using 2-hour fire resistance ratings throughout the hospital for all corridors for
consistency, ease of construction, and flexibility for future occupant changes and tenant improvements.
Note, the fire resistance rating for stairways would be placed along the perimeter of the green
areas (vertical exists) on the colored diagrams in the section on occupancy loads, while the fire
resistance rating for corridors would be placed along the perimeter of the dark blue areas (exit access),
except perhaps for the perimeters of the corridors that are along the other perimeter of the building
itself (though this situation is only widely present on the second floor that it may again make more
sense just to use 2-hour fire resistance rated material for all the corridors to avoid any mistakes or
oversight during construction/installation).
Also note, that for unsprinklered corridors, a ½-hour fire resistance rating is required by
18.4.4.7.1.1 NFPA 101, but this report assumes that this building will be sprinklered (as required by
18.3.5.1 NFPA 101). Even if it is not, the 2-hour fire resistance rating will provide more than the
minimum level of protection required by this section of the code.
As mentioned in A.18.6.3.2 NFPA 101, it is the intent of the code that there be no required fire
resistance or area limitations for vision panels in corridor walls and doors, and these can be examined
on a case-by-case basis should they be present.
Exit Signs
Exit signs are placed according to the requirements from the 2018 LSC, with particular attention
to 7.10.1.5.1 and 7.10.1.5.2.
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The main considerations used to place the exit signs were to make sure there was at least one
sign visible at all times along the exit access, and they were within 100 feet of each other. The report
assumes that the exit signs selected will be rated for a viewing distance greater than 100 feet, so the 100
feet requirement of 7.10.1.5.2 becomes the limiting factor.
Exit sign placement is shown in Figure # 25 – 30:
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Figure # 25. Basement Exit Signs
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Figure # 26. Floor 1 Exit Signs
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Figure # 27. Floor 2 Exit Signs
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Figure # 28. Floor 3 Exit Signs
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Figure # 29. Floor 4 Exit Signs
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Figure # 30. Floor 5 Exit Signs
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Note, at times the exit signs may seem to overlap, but this placement was necessitated by either
obstructions to viewing them (e.g. partitions, walls), over closely spaced and parallel corridors.
Interior Finish Requirements for Exits, Corridors and Other Spaces
The interior finish requirements for exits, corridors, and other spaces are primarily governed by
7.1.4.1, 7.1.4.2, and Chapter 10.2 (including 10.2.3, 10.2.3.4, 10.2.7.1, 10.2.7.3, 10.2.7.2., 10.2.7.4, Table
A.10.2.2, among others) of the 2018 LSC.
From Table A.10.2.2, new Health Care occupancies are required to have Class A interior wall and
ceiling finishes (flame spread index, 0-25 (new applications); smoke developed index, 0-450) for exits,
exit access corridors, and other spaces. There are allowances for Class B interior wall and ceiling finishes
(flame spread index, 26-75 (new applications); smoke developed index, 0-450) for the lower portion of
corridor walls or in small individual rooms, but no such allowance for corridors. This report also finds
that exits and exit access corridors are required to have Class I or II interior floor finishes (critical radiant
flux, not less than 0.45 W/cm2 for Class I, critical radiant flux, not more than 0.22 W/cm2, but less than
0.45 W/cm2 for Class II), but there are no requirements for floor finishes for other spaces.
Human Behavior in Fire
Occupant Characteristics
The SFPE Guide to Human Behavior in Fire provides an extensive list of occupant characteristics
to be used in describing occupants. For the purpose of this report, this information is assumed to be
true, and the example of Table 57.2 from the SFPE Handbook was used to create Table 17 below to
highlight characteristics that can affect occupant behavior and movement during a fire event.
Table # 17. Occupant Characteristics
Characteristic

Hospital Staff

Patients

Visitors
Variable, mainly concentrated
Population Numbers and Density Relatively high and steady
Variable
during business hours
Alone or with Others
With others
Varies
Varies
Familiarty with the Building
High
Low
Low
Distributed throughout facility, In medical spaces and bedrooms, In waiting spaces and bedrooms,
Distribution and Activities
working
recovering
visiting
Alertness
Awake
Awake/asleep
Awake
High ability to sense, respond, Low ability to sense, respond,
High ability to sense, respond,
Physical and Cognitive Ability
and react to cues
and react to cues
and react to cues
Caregiver for patients, will
Recipient of care, will react as an Family/friends of patients, will
Social Affiliation
react as a member of a group individual
react as a member of a group
Responsible for well-being of Recipient of care, will follow
May feel responsible for
Role and Responsibility
patients, will lead others
others
patients, will follow others
Location
Distributed throughout facility In medical spaces and bedrooms In waiting spaces and bedrooms
High commitment to patients
Commitment to patient and selfCommitment/Investment
and facility
Commitment to self-safety
safety
Focal Point
Work, including patients
May vary
Patients
Occupant Condition
Good
May vary
May vary
Other Factors
Has Training
Will need assistance
May be able to assist staff

Pre-movement Activities and Times
This report uses empirical data for pre-movement activities and times that are appropriate for
health care facilities based on the relevant occupant characteristics.
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Based on Table 64.4 (shown below in Table 19) and Table 64.5 of the SFPE Handbook 1 minute
should be used for health care occupancies. This assumes that the pre-movement times of this building
matches the mid- to upper-ranges of health care occupancies as reported by Gwynne et al. and Purser
and Bensilum (shown below in Table 18), and that the building pre-evacuation time can also be
approximated as that of medium egress time of high-rise office buildings (Table 19). Relying on trained
staff, pre-movement activities may include moving to patients that need movement assistance, securing
wheelchairs and rolling beds, and securing medical equipment. It should be noted that the data below is
measured at outpatient hospitals, and that the scale involved (19 patients, over 225 patients) is much
smaller than that of our building. However, even the differences between these examples from Table
18, the pre-movement time does not dramatically increase. We assume that the size of a hospital is not
as important a factor then; rather, other factors such as time of day and staff training may explain
discrepancies in pre-movement time. On that note, while this data is for outpatient hospitals, our
building will have non-ambulatory occupants. This is an important fact that we will model later in this
report in Pathfinder. The movement speeds of such occupants may also be accounted for in hand
calculations. However, for the purpose of pre-movement time, we take it as the amount of time that
lapses before evacuation begins, and the response time of staff and occupants in that sense will not be
largely effected by whether there are ambulatory patients or not: staff and patients will still have a
period of time while they consider whether or not the fire alarm valid or not, and then will have to react
afterwards.
In fact, comparing Tables 18 and 19, the health care facilities show a shorter pre-movement
time than hotels, office buildings, and apartment buildings. As discussed in Fire Protection Engineering
courses and literature, the environment and expectations for locations may bias occupant behavior, and
skew pre-movement times. Given the considerations of pre-movement vs movement, and the
performance of health care occupancies outlined above, it is assumed in this report that the presence of
non-ambulatory occupants will affect the movement time and total egress time, and not the premovement time. As a final note, this 1 minute pre-movement time may be too optimistic; acceptance by
the AHJ, field experiments at other hospitals, and other steps may be taken to verify if this is
appropriate.
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Table # 18. Pre-evacuation Time, Health Care Occupancies
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Table # 19. Delay Times Derived from Actual Fires, and Evacuation Exercises
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Based on the Cal Poly SLO FPE Program, this report recognizes that premovement time consists
of recognition (or reaction) time and response (or pre-evacuation activity) time, whereas movement
time consists of the travel time. The reaction time in turn consists of perception and interpretation time.
It is expected that the reaction time should be low, considering the presence of trained medical staff,
and that the majority of the pre-movement time is spent on response time in preparing patients for
transport.
Emergency Movement and Egress Models
Hydraulic Model
This report uses a first-order approximation of the hydraulic model to estimate the egress time
from the building. Assumptions and references are below.
Assumptions
This report makes several assumptions when calculating the egress time
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Floor-to-floor height is 12 ft.
Stair risers are 7 in. wide; treads are 11 in. high.
Each stair is 44 in. wide (tread width) with handrails protruding 2.5 in.
There are two 4 ft x 8 ft landings per floor of stairway travel.
There is one 36 in. clear width door at each stairway entrance and exit.
The first floor does not exit through stairways.
This report does not consider the first floor in this egress calculation.
The prime controlling factor will be either the stairways or the door discharging from them.
Queuing will occur; therefore, the specific flow, Fs, will be the maximum specific flow, Fsm.
All occupants start egress at the same time.
The population will use all facilities in the optimum balance.
Assume egress time due to travel within the floor is negligible compared to queue times; in
other words, egress time is a function of people waiting to reach an exit, not travel from their
space on the floor towards an exit (and its queue).
13. This report assumes a first-order approximation of the hydraulic model can be used to estimate
the egress time, as described in class, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook Chapter 4-2 Calculation
Methods for Egress Prediction, and SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Chapter 59 Employing the
Hydraulic Model in Emergency Movement.
Additionally, in this calculation, this report assumes that all occupants are mobile, and are moving at
a ‘healthy’ speed, as is ‘built-in’ for the default values and tables below. There are more accurate speeds
from the NFPA Handbook that can be used to modify this behavior, and this will be done in the section
on performance-based analysis in this report (at which time this report will also explore additional
features, such as egress elevators and horizontal exits). Also, occupants begin to move immediately
during this calculation, so this report adds a premovement time based on Table 64.4 and Table 64.5 for
health care occupancies.
Calculation
This report first estimates the flow capacity through a door. From Table 59.1 of the SFPE
Handbook, the effective width, We, of each door is 42 – 12 = 30 in. (2.5 ft). From Table 59.5, maximum
specific flow through any 42 in. door is 24 persons/min/ft effective width. Therefore, using equation
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59.8, from the SFPE Handbook, the flow through any door is limited to 24 x 2.5 = 60 persons/min.
Therefore, 60 persons/min will be the rate at which occupants in the floor can enter the stairway.
To double-check that the stairway does not have a lower flow capacity (thus restricting
occupant egress, causing a bottleneck on the stairs and longer-than-expected queue to form by the
doors, and throwing off the calculated flow capacity above), this report performs flow capability
calculations on the stairs.
From Table 59.1, the effective width, We, of each stairway is 56 – 12 in. = 44 in. (3.67 ft). From
Table 59.5, maximum specific flow for the stairway is 18.5 persons/min/ft effective width. Specific flow,
Fs, equals maximum specific flow, Fsm. Therefore, using equation 59.6, the flow from each stairway is
limited to 18.5 x 3.67 = 67.8 persons/min. The stairways has a higher flow capacity than the doors, so
the queues will form at the doors, not the stairways.
This report estimates the speed of movement for estimated stairway flow. From equation 59.5,
S = k – akD, and the appropriate factors from Table 59.2, the speed of movement down the stairs is 212
– (2.86 x 212 x 0.175) = 105 ft/min. Note, this report assumes a D of 0.175, because this density
produces the maximum achievable flow rate (SFPE Handbook, 5th ed., page 2125). The travel distance
between floors (using the conversion factor from Table 59.3) is 12 x 1.85 = 22.2 ft on the stair slope plus
8 ft travel on each of the two landings, for a total floor-to-floor travel distance of 22.2 + (2 x 8) = 38.2 ft.
The travel time for a person moving with the flow is 38.2/105 = 0.36 min/floor.
If all of the occupants in the building start evacuation at the same time, each stairway can
discharge 48 person/min. The population of 2,654 persons above the first floor will require
approximately 2654 persons / 60 persons/min/exit / 3 exits = 14.74 minutes to pass through the exits.
This report must also account for the 76 people in the basement leaving through one exit, which gives
76 persons / 60 persons/min/exit / 1 exit = 1.27 min. An additional 0.36 minute travel time is required
for the movement from the second floor to the exit, and from the basement to the exit. The total
minimum evacuation time for the 2654 persons located on floors 2 through 5 and 76 persons located in
the basement is estimated at 14.74 min + 0.36 min + 1.27 min + 0.36 min = 16.73 min, or, rounding up,
approximately 16.8 minutes. The results of these calculations are summarized in Table 20 below.
Table # 20. Hydraulic Model Egress Travel Time
Occupants
(persons)
Floors 2-5:
2654
Basement:
76

Calculated
Flow
(persons/min)

48

Egress
Time per
Exit (min)
Floors 2-5:
40.3
Basement:
1.3

Egress
Number
Time
of Exits
(min)
Floors 2-5: Floors 2-5:
3
13.4
Basement: Basement:
1
1.3

Additional
Transit
(min)

Total
Egress Time
(min)

0.36

16.8

As stated before, this calculation is for the travel time. If premovement time is also needed, 1
minute should be used, based on SFPE Handbook Table 64.4 and Table 64.5 for health care occupancies.
Uses and Limitations of this Analysis
The egress analysis above focuses on ‘traditional’ egress means and features. Under traditional
egress means and features, it is assumed occupants move at normal speeds and complete a full
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evacuation of the building. This serves to provide a ‘best case’ scenario of full evacuation. In the
computer-based egress model below, it was determined that the fifth floor takes the longest to
evacuate. Given the fact that this floor primarily consists of a large number of classrooms and business
offices, this model likely reflects reality. However, considering the nature of the occupants in this
building, it is more likely that a defend-in-place strategy with horizontal exits would be used during a fire
event. The evacuation strategy for this building will be examined more in the performance-based
analysis portion of this report.
Computer-based Egress Model
The building and its occupants were modeled in Pathfinder in order to see if the Hydraulic
Model hand calculations match with that estimated by industry tools. Because this report had access to
floorplans but not CAD drawings, each floorplan was imported as a background image, then each
feature was ‘traced’ over by hand to create the model.
The simulation was run in both SFPE and Steering Modes. A table comparing the egress time
that was calculated to the model predictions is below in Table # 19, and screenshots from the program
are also shown here as Figures 31 – 33. A special thanks to Daniel Swenson from Thunderhead
Engineering and the whole Thunderhead Engineering team for their help in resolving problems
encountered when building this model.
Table # 21. Comparison of Egress Travel Times by Model
Egress Model Summary
Egress Model

Time (min)

Hydraulic Model

16:44

Pathfinder, SFPE Mode

18:09

Pathfinder, Steering Mode

16:58
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Figure # 31. Z-axis View of Pathfinder Model
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Figure # 32. X-axis View of Pathfinder Model
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Figure # 33. Y-axis View of Pathfinder Model
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The Pathfinder model produced is attached for review. Note, in order to see both run times
shown here, one must run the simulation in both SFPE and Steering Modes. It is recommended that two
copies of the underlying file be created, with different file names to distinguish them and their result
files (e.g. Hospital SFPE.pth, Hospital Steering.pth).
Comparing egress times in Table # 19 above, the Hydraulic Model calculation performed earlier
yielded a slightly longer egress time than Pathfinder in Steering Mode, but a shorter time than
Pathfinder in SFPE Mode. In reviewing the three-dimensional results over time of occupant egress, it is
clear that there are at least two major differences between the Hydraulic Model calculation and
Pathfinder:
1. Perhaps most importantly, there is a sub-optimal utilization of the stairs: Pathfinder modeled
the majority of occupants as using the western staircase. Though there was some movement
between queues to try to find a faster egress, by the end the western staircase by the main
entrance remained fully utilized for some minutes even as the two staircases at the eastern end
of the building were not.
2. Travel time from different spaces on the floor to and from the stairs was explicitly accounted for
in the model. In contrast, the hydraulic model neglected travel to and from the stairs because
the dominating term was the stair queueing. Not accounting for travel to and from the stairs is
one reason why there is an increase in the estimated egress time in the SFPE mode.
Assumptions
Many of the same assumptions made for the Hydraulic Model also apply to he Pathfinder
model. Some Pathfinder-specific assumptions in this first pass include distributing the occupant load of
the floor across all the occupied spaces. From different iterations of the model, the ‘critical path’ of
egress seems to primarily depend on ‘bottlenecks’ that develop at the entrance to the staircases, so
occupant distribution among individual floors seem to have little effect (because no matter where they
start, occupants will end up queuing at the stairs anyway). As before, movement speeds were left on the
default for healthy, mobile adults, and will be updated in the performance-based analysis section of this
report.
Uses and Limitations of this Analysis
As for the hydraulic model, the Pathfinder model does not take into account horizontal exits or
areas of refuge, and instead focuses on full egress at this level. The Pathfinder model then serves as a
‘best case’ scenario. However, the model shows that the fifth floor takes the longest to evacuate (with
its classrooms, business offices, assembly spaces, etc.), and, assuming that these occupants will be
mobile, alert adults, this model may not be so far off in estimating a full egress time. A full analysis, the
modeling and hospital beds requiring assistance to travel (something that Pathfinder supports), will be
conducted in the performance-based analysis section of this report.
Tenability Analysis
Tenability Performance Criteria
This report uses several sources to set tenability limits for the project building, taking into
account the occupant characteristics associated with this hospital. This report categorizes the tenability
criterial into three broad categories: visibility/smoke density, heat effects, and toxic/irritant gases.
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Visibility and Smoke Density
For visibility/smoke density, this report relies on Chapter 61 of the SFPE Handbook. From Table
61.3 and Table 61.4, this report assumes occupants who are unfamiliar with the inside of the building as
a conservative estimate, and uses a smoke density (extinction coefficient) of 0.15 1/m and visibility of 13
m (42.6 ft). Note, these limits are close to those proposed by fire researchers such as Kawagoe (0.1 1/m)
and the Los Angeles Fire Department (45 ft, 13.5 m).
Heat Effects
For heat effects, this report turns to Chapter 63 of the SFPE Handbook, and uses Table 63.20,
Table 63.28, Table 63.29
From these tables, it can be determined that typically occupants can be exposed to radiation
intensity of 2.5 kW/m2 for 30 seconds less, and that they experience convection of 100oC at < 10 % H2O
for less than 12 minutes. Because of the potential weakened state of patients, this report can apply a
safety factor of 20% - 50% to these limits, as to be agreed upon by stakeholders (client, AHJ, etc.).
Toxic and Irritant Gases
For toxic and irritant gases, this report uses the materials from the Cal Poly SLO FPE Program,
and Chapter 63 of the SFPE Handbook (including the Appendix, and relevant equations such as 63.15,
63.35, 63.38, 63.39, 63.18, Table 63.4, Figure 63.20, Table 63.10, etc.) to set limits and calculate the FED,
Fractional Effective Dose.
As discussed in Cal Poly SLO’s FPE Program and in the SFPE Handbook, Chapter 63, pages 2352 –
2356, the exposure dose (percent COHb) for incapacitation, D, varies depending on the level of activity.
This report selects the appropriate values of D to use in these calculations from the curves in Figure
63.20 and from Table 63.10.
This report use D = 50 %COHb as the lethal level based on Table 63.4, and because “50 %COHb is
usually considered as an average lethal level (SFPE Handbook, 5th ed., page 2347).
This report assumes that 40 %COHb would lead to loss of consciousness for healthy resting
individuals, but this can occur at even lower levels for more susceptible resting subjects, and lower
levels can be dangerous for subjects with compromised cardiac function.
For this reason, this report would take a tenability limit of 20 %COHb, 100 ppm HCN for 10
minutes (Table 63.12), and CO2 limits should be examined based on the FED model, in conjunction with
other gases.
For irritants, this report takes half of the levels from Table 2-6.12 of the NFPA Handbook, as
shown in Table 22 below:
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Table # 22. Irritant Gas Levels (ppm)
Gas
Limit (ppm)
HCl
100
HBr
100
HF
100
SO2
12
NO2
35
CH2CHO
2
HCHO
3

Methodology to Evaluate Building Performance Objectives under Section 502 of the LSC
In order to evaluate whether or not the building meets the performance objectives for
tenability, there are several methods in A.5.2.2. Of the four methods presented, it is in the report
author’s engineering judgement that Methods 3 (smoke layer will never descend below 6 feet above the
floor) and 4 (fire will not spread to occupied rooms) will be extremely difficult to achieve with such a
large and complex hospital building for this project, so this report will not use those methods. Of the
remaining two methods, Method 1 (PFD, using tools such as FED) and 2 (evacuation before smoke layer
descends to below 6 feet above the floor) both have pros and cons associated with them.
Method 1 has the benefit of being more flexible in a way; there is no ‘red line’ like Method 2,
tying evacuation time to smoke level descent. Rather, FPE’s are allowed the freedom to use all manner
of tools available to them to prevent occupants from experiencing untenable conditions. The strength of
using this method for this project is that FPE’s are able to use multiple strategies to protect occupants.
The weakness is that FPE’s must account for all variables that might threaten their safety, and ensure
that no tenability limits are breached.
Method 2 has a more straight-forward and easily measurable metric, and in conjunction with
the expectation of trained staff and horizontal exits, it is expected that the necessary evacuation time
can be achieved in this project building. While this method does not explicitly list protection from all
tenability criteria, it seems reasonable to assume that if the smoke layer does not descend below 6 feet,
other tenability criteria such as toxic gas concentration and visibility would also be met.
For these reasons, this report would recommend to the client that Method 2 be pursued at this
time to show that the building meets performance objectives outlined in Section 502 of the LSC.
Simultaneously, the report author would understand if the AHJ would require the use of Method 1
instead of Method 2, and would also be able to use this method.

Conclusion
This chapter serves as a basic egress analysis and design for the Baylor, Scott & White Hospital in
College Town, TX. Additional refinements have been identified at several points (movement speed,
elevators, etc.), and these will be forth-coming in the performance-based design section below. This
report next examines the suppression system in this building.
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Suppression
Introduction
Sprinkler systems are a common sight in many facilities. For this building, they are required by
code: an automatic sprinkler system shall be provided throughout buildings with a Group I fire area
(2018 IBC, 903.2.6).
Where the provisions of this code require a building or portion thereof be equipped throughout
with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with this section, sprinklers shall be installed
throughout in accordance with NFPA 13. (2018 IBC, 903.3.1.1).
The applicable sprinkler standard for this project is the 2016 edition of NFPA 13. From NFPA 13,
several requirements for sprinklers in hospitals are present:
Hospitals will be protected with an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler system in
accordance with Section 9.7 (2018 NFPA 101, 18.3.5.1).
Listed quick-response or listed residential sprinklers shall be used throughout smoke
compartments containing patient sleeping rooms (2018 NFPA 101, 18.3.5.6).

Body
Water Supply Information
The building fire water supply information shown in Table # 23 below was estimated based on
websites of College Station, TX water utility, building department, and fire department, as well as calls
to those parties.
This report assumes that the water flow shown in Table # 23 was measured at a Point of
Connection (POC) separate from the Base of the Riser (BOR). The report includes a sprinkler system
design using Schedule 40 Steel with a Hazen Williams Coefficient C = 120. In the absence of further
information, this report will assume that the City Water supply is also provided in the same type of pipe.
The calculations based on this assumption should be updated if additional information becomes
available.
Static pressure
Residual pressure
Flow

Table # 23. Water Supply Information
80 psi
60 psi
1000 gpm

Building Occupancy Classifications
This report determined the building occupancy classifications based on Chapter 5 of NFPA 13,
and the various tables including Table 5.6 of Annex A of NFPA 13. Two sections in particular that are
applicable to the building are as follows:
A.5.2 Light hazard occupancies, including churches, education, hospitals, libraries, nursing or
convalescent homes, residential, restaurant seating areas, theaters and auditoriums (2016 NFPA 13,
A.5.2).
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A.5.3.1 Ordinary hazard (Group 1) occupancies, including laundries, mechanical rooms (2016
NFPA 13, A.5.3.1).
Based on A.5.2 and A.5.3.1 of NFPA 13, this report is likely able to apply the requirements for
light hazard occupancies to the majority of the building. However, based on the presence of mixed-use
spaces, and the potential for occupants changing the use of a space, it is recommended to apply
ordinary hazard (group 1) throughout the entire hospital to be conservative.
Automatic Sprinkler System
This report next shows the design a wet-pipe sprinkler system for this building. Due to the
building’s location in College Town, TX, this report assumes a maximum ceiling temperature of 112oF
and choose an ordinary temperature classification, with a sprinkler temperature rating of 175-225oF
from Table 6.2.5.1 NFPA 13.
From 8.2.1 NFPA 13, this report obtains the maximum floor area for each sprinkler system riser
as shown in Table 24 below. This report will use these numbers for each Space, and determine how
many risers are needed.
Occupancy Classification

Light hazard
Ordinary hazard
Extra hazard
Storage

Table # 24. System Protection Area Limitations
Maximum floor area to be protected by sprinklers
supplied by any one sprinkler system riser or
combined system riser:
52,000 ft2
52,000 ft2
40,000 ft2
40,000 ft2

From the calculations for each space below, this report will show that two risers for each of the
bottom three floors (the Basement, Floor 1, and Floor 2) are required, while one riser for each of the top
three floors (Floor 3, Floor 4, and Floor 5) is sufficient.
This report will also determine the sprinkler system type for each floor, and provide calculations
supporting that design. For all floors, the sprinkler system design will be a Control Mode Density Area
(CMDA) system.
The layout of the sprinkler piping system is based on the requirements in NFPA 13. Note, this
report uses a simple tree system as was discussed in the Cal Poly FPE 523 Module 6 lectures. In practice,
a grid layout or some other alternatives may be used, but for the purposes of this report, a simple layout
is used.
A design area is selected, and pipe sizes are determined with hydraulic calculations (shown in
the next section of this report). Depending on the AHJ, additional information may be needed.
Computer programs used in the Fire Protection Engineering industry would likely be of great help in this
regard. From the calculations shown below, a design area that is the most hydraulically demanding area
of each sprinkler system is found.
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For each Floor, this report sets the sprinklers at the finished from the ceiling (10’ high). The
risers run 10’-6” high to the feeder mains and cross mains. There is a decrease of 6” of elevation to the
branch lines and sprinklers.
Sprinkler Risers
Through examining the square footage of each floor, it can be determined that the lower floors
have a large enough area that they require multiple risers, while the upper floors are small enough that
they only require one riser each. Table # 25 below summarizes the specific requirements, and below
Table # 25 are Figure # 34 – 39 showing dimensions and areas for each floor that this report will us for
the Suppression section.
Floor
Basement
Floor 1
Floor 2
Floor 3
Floor 4
Floor 5

Table # 25. Floor Riser Requirements
Number of Risers
2
2
2
1
1
1

Basement
The Basement is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
The Basement is calculated to have a floor area of 61,263 ft2 (Figure # 34 below). The floor area
of the Basement is over the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so two sprinkler risers are needed
for the Basement.

Floor 1
Floor 1 is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
Floor 1 is calculated to have a floor area of 62,263 ft2 (Figure # 35 below). The floor area of Floor
1 is over the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so two sprinkler risers are needed for Floor 1.

Floor 2
Floor 2 is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
Floor 2 is calculated to have a floor area of 61,340 ft2 (Figure # 36 below). The floor area of Floor
2 is over the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so two sprinkler risers are needed for Floor 2.

Floor 3
Floor 3 is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
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Floor 3 is calculated to have a floor area of 46,009 ft2 (Figure # 37 below). The floor area of Floor
3 is under the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so one sprinkler riser is needed for Floor 3.

Floor 4
Floor 4 is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
Floor 4 is calculated to have a floor area of 44,568 ft2 (Figure # 38 below). The floor area of Floor
4 is under the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so one sprinkler riser is needed for Floor 4.
Floor 5
Floor 5 is classified as Ordinary Hazard, Group I.
Floor 5 is calculated to have a floor area of 44,568 ft2 (Figure # 39 below). The floor area of Floor
5 is under the 52,000 ft2 threshold from 8.2.1 NFPA 13, so one sprinkler riser is needed for Floor 5.
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Figure # 34. Basement Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Figure # 35. Floor 1 Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Figure # 36. Floor 2 Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Figure # 37. Floor 3 Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Figure # 38. Floor 4 Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Figure # 39. Floor 5 Sprinkler Area and Dimensions
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Sprinkler System Type
For past projects, different type of sprinklers (CMDA, CMSA, ESFR) were analyzed to find which
one has the lowest total nominal water demand. For the purpose of this project, it is assumed that a
CMDA system, and find a total nominal water demand as shown below.
For Ordinary Hazard Group 1, a CMDA water demand analysis is performed per NFPA 13 as
follows:
From Figure 11.2.3.1.1, design criteria would be 0.15 gpm/S.F. over 1,500 S.F.

From Table 11.2.3.1.2 of NFPA 13, HSA = 250 gpm and duration is 60-90 min.
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Total flow rate is (0.15 gpm/ft2 x 1,500 ft2 + 250 gpm) x 60 min = 28,500 gallons.
The total nominal water demand is 28,500 gallons.
From Section 11.2.3.2.3.2 of NFPA 13, ‘The number of sprinklers in the design area shall never be less
than five.’
From Table 8.6.2.2.1(b) of NFPA 13, the Protection Area is 130 S.F., with a Maximum Spacing of 15’.
From Section 23.4 of NPFA 13, the number of sprinklers in design area Ns is given by Ns = area of
operation/area per sprinkler = 1,500 S.F./130 S.F./sprinkler = 11.54 sprinklers -> 12 sprinklers
Considering the entire Space area of 61,263 S.F., this implies the need for 61,263 S.F./130 S.F./sprinkler
= 471.25 sprinklers -> 472 sprinklers
For completeness, this report performs the same CMDA water demand analysis per NFPA 13 for
Light Hazard as follows:
From Figure 11.2.3.1.1 of NFPA 13 (shown above in Ordinary hazard calculation), design criteria would
be 0.10 gpm/S.F. over 1,500 S.F.
From Table 11.2.3.1.2 of NFPA 13 (shown above in Ordinary hazard calculation), HSA = 100 gpm and
duration is 30 min.
Total flow rate is (0.1 gpm/ft2 x 1,500 ft2 + 100 gpm) x 30 min = 7,500 gallons.
The total nominal water demand is 7,500 gallons.
79

From Section 11.2.3.2.3.2 of NFPA 13, ‘The number of sprinklers in the design area shall never be less
than five.’
From Table 8.6.2.2.1(a) of NFPA 13, the Protection Area is 225 S.F., with a Maximum Spacing of 15’. This
is true whether the construction type is noncombustible unobstructed or combustible unobstructed
with no exposed members, so long as the system type is hydraulically calculated.
From 23.4, the number of sprinklers in design area Ns is given by Ns = area of operation/area per
sprinkler = 1,500 S.F./225 S.F./sprinkler = 6.67 sprinklers -> 7 sprinklers.
Sprinkler Layout
From the previous sections, the number of risers needed per floor was determined, as well as
the protection area and maximum spacing for this project (130 sq. ft. and 15 feet for Ordinary Hazard
Group 1).
The protection area, not the maximum spacing, is the limiting factor, such that branch lines can
be placed 13 feet apart, with sprinklers on each branch 10 feet apart. To account for the need to ‘shift’
sprinkler placement in the field due to factors such as ceiling tile patterns and obstructions (e.g. exit
signs), this report chooses a sprinkler layout with a more conservative spacing—branch lines are placed
12 feet apart, and keep sprinklers on each branch 10 feet apart.
A rough layout of the sprinkler system is shown below in Figures 40 – 45. Note, at times, an
additional branch line is added to each cross main, if it seen that additional coverage is needed, such as
if a corridor is between two branch lines. Additionally, care is taken to add sprinklers to each room. All
of these sprinkler placements should be re-verified in the field, and the final placement will be
contingent on what is actually built.
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Figure # 40. Basement Sprinkler Layout
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Figure # 41. Floor 1 Sprinkler Layout
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Figure # 42. Floor 2 Sprinkler Layout
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Figure # 43. Floor 3 Sprinkler Layout
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Figure # 44. Floor 4 Sprinkler Layout
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Figure # 45. Floor 5 Sprinkler Layout
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Design Area
By Section 8.3.4 of NFPA 13, this report uses sprinklers with a K-factor of 5.6 and ½ NPT.
From Section 11.2.3.2.3.2 of NFPA 13, ‘The number of sprinklers in the design area shall never
be less than five.’
With a width of 40’, this report finds a length of 37’-6” for the design area (1500/40 = 37.5). In
such an area, there would be 3 branch lines (branch lines spaced 12 feet apart). Each branch line has 4
sprinklers in this area. This report thus considers 12 sprinklers in the design area (4 branch lines x 3
sprinklers per branch line = 12 sprinklers).
A design area for each floor and each riser may be calculated. Such calculations would be
assisted by commercial software. For the purpose of this report, it is assumed that an ‘overall’ design
area can be found by finding the most remote area of any floor, and ‘adding’ the highest elevation to
this, in order to find a conservative design area that will dictate the size of fire pump, without detailed
analysis for each floor or riser. Naturally, the use of an overall design as described would be a more
general solution, and a more detailed analysis may be desired to arrive at a design area that is less
conservative. This solution is presented to illustrate an understanding of the concepts and calculations
of water-based fire suppression.
Neglecting for the moment, from the sprinkler layout in the previous section, the most
demanding design area is on Floor 1, by the main entrance (Figure # 46 below). This is because Floor 1 is
the largest floor, and the distance traveled to the main entrance is the furthest horizontal run between
the fire pump (and the areas directly above or below the fire pump) to the very end of the cross main
and branch lines. In this design area, the extremes of three branch lines, with 4 sprinklers each, are
encompassed in this design area. It is to this horizontal travel distance that the vertical height of the
highest sprinklers in the building on Floor 5 is added, in order to arrive a general, overall design as
described in the preceding paragraph. This overall design is the hypothetical, most demanding area of
the sprinkler system that is then used to size the fire pump and estimate sprinkler pipe diameters.
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Figure # 46. Sprinkler Design Area
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Pipe Sizing
Using the Hydraulic Calculations shown in the next section, this report sizes the sprinkler pipe as
Schedule 40 steel with a Hazen Williams Coefficient C = 120 as shown in the next section. The pipe sizes
are based on the goal of achieving a friction loss of psi/ft of between 0.1 – 0.2 psi/ft, with a preference
towards going below 0.1 psi/ft instead of above 0.2 psi/ft if there was a choice.
Hydraulic Calculations and Graphs
Summary
Hydraulic calculations and graphs are shown in Tables # 26 – 27 and Figures # 47 – 48 for the
design area. Additional ones may be generated for each floor and riser, but as discussed in the previous
section, this report has combined the most remote section of any floor with the total elevation of the
building, to create a conservative design area that can apply to all of the systems. This report uses this
design area and determine that the sprinkler demand necessitates the use of a fire pump. A theoretical
fire pump based on a 10% safety factor is specified with a rated flow and pressure. One should select
the next largest, nominal size of fire pump for installation (as opposed to ordering a custom-built fire
pump that matches the theoretical flow and pressure).
As mentioned in the Water Supply section, without more information on the connection
between the BOR and POC, this report assumes the pipe used there is the same as is used in the
sprinkler system. Depending on one’s engineering judgement, the assumption of the same type of pipe
used in both the sprinkler and between the BOR and POC does not seem unreasonable, but this
assumption can and should be revised once new information comes to light.
Note, this report uses total pressure method only, since it is more conservative than the velocity
pressure method.
For a fire pump, this report creates a fire pump curve based on the following points for a given flow
and pressure rating:
1. 120% of pressure at churn (0 gpm) – this is more conservative than 140% of pressure at churn
2. 65% of pressure at 150% of flow
To calculate other points on the graphs, this report uses the Hazen Williams formula:
Pa = Ps – (Ps – Pr) * ((Qa / Qt) ^ 1.85), where
Pa is the available pressure
Ps is the static pressure
Pr is the residual pressure
Qa is the actual flow
Qt is the test pressure
This report can rearrange this equation from finding a pressure given a certain flow, to finding
the flow given a certain pressure:
Pa = Ps – (Ps – Pr) * ((Qa / Qt) ^ 1.85)
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Pa + (Ps – Pr) * ((Qa / Qt) ^ 1.85) = Ps
(Ps – Pr) * ((Qa / Qt) ^ 1.85) = Ps – Pa
(Qa / Qt) ^ 1.85 = (Ps – Pa) / (Ps – Pr)
Qa / Qt = ((Ps – Pa) / (Ps – Pr)) ^ (1/1.85)
Qa = Qt * ((Ps – Pa) / (Ps – Pr)) ^ (1/1.85)
This report applies this formula to each of the Spaces and graphs above, to find the difference
between the City Supply and the Sprinkler Demand curves, in order to find the pump specification (rated
pressure/flow).
Hydraulic Calculations
The Sprinkler Demand as shown in Tables # 26 – 27 and Figures # 47 – 48 is 573.7 gpm at 151.1
psi. The available Water Supply is 573.7 gpm at 72.8 psi. With a 10% safety factor, this building would
require a fire pump rated for at least 573.7 gpm at 86.2 psi.
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Table # 26. Sprinkler Hydraulic Calculations
Nozzle
Ident and
Location

Step
No.
1 1 BL-1

2 2

3 3

4 4 DN
RN

5

CM
to
BL-2

6

BL-2
CM to
BL-3

7

BL-3
CM

8

CM
to
FIS

9

UG
to
main

Pipe
Fittings
and
Equivalent Friction
Flow in gpm Pipe size Devices Pipe Length loss (psi/ft)
q
1-1/4"
L
10 C= 120
F
Q
26.0
T
10 pf 0.055
q
26.3
1-1/2"
L
10 C= 120
F
Q
52.3
T
10 pf 0.096
q
26.9
2"
L
10 C= 120
F
Q
79.2
T
10 pf 0.061
q
0.0
2"
T-15' L
80 C= 120
E-7'
F
22
Q
79.2
T
102 pf 0.061
q
0.0
2"
L
12 C= 120
F
Q
79.2
T
12 pf 0.061
q
80.2
2-1/2"
L
12 C= 120
F
Q
159.4
T
12 pf 0.094
q
81.6
3"
L
12 C= 120
F
Q
241.0
T
12 pf 0.070
q
82.7
3"
3E-21' L
460 C= 120
GV-1' F
38
Q
323.7
AV-16' T
498 pf 0.121
q
0.0
3"
E-7'
L
241 C= 120
GV-1' F
23
Q
323.7
T-15' T
264 pf 0.121
q
250.0
L
C=
F
Q
573.7
T
pf
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Pressure
Summary
Pt
21.6
Pe
Pf
0.6
Pt
22.1
Pe
Pf
1.0
Pt
23.1
Pe
Pf
0.6
Pt
23.7
Pe
0.4
Pf
6.2
Pt
30.3
Pe
Pf
0.7
Pt
31.1
Pe
Pf
1.1
Pt
32.2
Pe
Pf
0.8
Pt
33.0
Pe
Pf
60.2
Pt
93.2
Pe
26.0
Pf
31.9
Pt
151.1
Pe
Pf

Normal
Pressure
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn
Pt
Pv
Pn

Notes
D = 0.2 gpm/S.F.
K = 5.6
Q= 26
q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Pt= 21.6
q= 26.33217396

q=

26.8952543

q=
Pe= 0.433
q=
K=
q=

14.4
80.17783151

q=

81.61618298

q=

82.67373847

q=
Pe= 25.98
HSA 250

Table # 27. Fire Pump Calculation
Q=
HSA=
Q+HSA=
Q=
HSA=
Q+HSA=

323.7 gpm
250 gpm
573.7 gpm
323.7 gpm
250 gpm
573.7 gpm

Qt=
Ps=
Pr=
Pa=

1000 gpm
80 psi
60 psi
20 psi

Qa=

1810.937 gpm

Qt=
Ps=
Pr=
Qa=

1000 gpm
80 psi
60 psi
573.7 psi

Pa=
90% Pa=
Delta P=
Pump
P
Q

72.84532 psi
64.84532
86.2 psi

86.2 psi
573.7 gpm

120% P
0% Q

103.4599 psi
0 gpm

65% P
150% Q

56.04079 psi
860.5428 gpm

Combined
P
Q

159.1 psi
573.7 gpm

120% P
0% Q

183.4599 psi
0 gpm

65% P
150% Q

120.8927 psi
860.5428 gpm
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Figure # 47. Sprinkler Demand Curve
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Figure # 48. Combined Supply Curve
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Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements
Inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) should be performed according to NFPA 25. Note,
while experts and contractors may be used, ITM it is ultimately the property owner’s responsibility
(Baylor Scott & White Medical Center in this case).
NFPA 25 requires quarterly and annual tests. Quarterly tests include visual checks of valves,
gauges, water flow and supervisory alarms, nameplates, fire department connections, and pressurereducing valves and relief valves. Annual tests include visual checks of all sprinkler heads, stocks of spare
sprinkler heads, the interior of dry valves, and a main drain water flow test. Fire pumps also have
monthly or quarterly tests (depending if a diesel or electric fire pump is installed), as well as an annual
test. NFPA 25 discusses fire pump ITM, and NFPA 20 also has more details regarding fire pump ITM.
It is also recommended that visual inspections of the sprinkler system by staff take place on a
regularly scheduled basis as part of routine maintenance, beyond the requirements of NFPA 25. These
maintenance rounds can include checking for missing sprinklers, damaged pipe, vandalism, signs of
corrosion, and obstructions to equipment.
Engineering reevaluations of the sprinkler system may also be done, especially and if the
building or spaces are modified.

Conclusion
This report considered a design to provide protection to the Baylor Scott & White Medical
Center in College Station, TX through a water-based fire suppression system, in the form of a wet pipe
sprinkler systems. The calculations divided the total area under consideration into separate Spaces, and
considered each individually. This report specified sprinkler types, pipe layout and sizing, and fire pumps
per FPE 523 and NFPA 13.
The approach taken in this chapter is a simple one by choice. It is likely another engineer can
identify improvements to the designs proposed here—the choice of a tree layout instead of a grid, the
specific pipe sizes used, and research into the piping between the BOR and POC are some low-hanging
fruit that come to mind. However, it is hoped that this chapter demonstrates sound engineering
judgement, as well as a basic understanding of water-based fire suppression systems. This report next
examines the notification systems of this building.
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Alarms
Introduction
Unless otherwise noted, all code references in this chapter come from the 2016 edition of NFPA
72: National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. Other codes referenced include the 2018 edition of NFPA 99:
Heath Care Facilities Code and the 2018 edition of NFPA 101: Life Safety Code, as well as the 2018
addition of the International Fire Code and International Building Code.

Body
Fire Alarm and Communication Systems
Type of Fire Alarm
As a first stage, the fire alarm and communication system for the project building is designed as
a protected premises (local) system. It is the intent that this system be designed in anticipation of
‘upgrading’ to another type of system, such as a remote or proprietary supervising system (whether in
the future or as a modification of this design per stakeholder desires).
EVACS or MNS may also be considered, depending on other infrastructure such as PA speakers
or video screens. The use of EVACS or MNS is discussed in more detail in the Emergency Communication
System section of this report.
Operating Characteristics
This fire alarm system is designed to be a private alarm system. In conjunction with AHJ, building
owners, staff, and other stakeholders, the intent of this design is one of extensive detection, with
controlled and measured alarm, response, and movement. To that effect, this report uses multi-sensor
detectors throughout the facility. These will serve to decrease fire detection times, over relying on water
flow activation switches from water-based fire suppression system this report has discussed in chapters
above.
Model and Location of Fire Alarm Control Panel
In keeping with the design philosophy of anticipating additional upgrades, this report selects a
fire alarm control panel that can be adapted for future demands. A EST3-Sixty Fire Alarm Control Panel is
used, and is located by the main entrance of the hospital. Cut sheets for this equipment are attached as
a supplement to this report, separate from the Appendixes, and its location can be seen on plan views.
Fire signatures and detection devices
Types and locations of initiating devices installed in the building
This building uses both smoke detectors and manual fire pull boxes as the initiating devices. A
plan view of the device placement is shown in Figures 49 – 54. Devices are placed per the IFC, IBC, NFPA
72, NFPA 70, NFPA 99 Health Care Facilities Code, NFPA 101 Life Safety Code. Though no MEP systems
such as ductwork and HVAC are not shown, smoke duct detectors must also be installed to shut down
fans and close dampers to prevent smoke from traveling from one smoke compartment to another
through ductwork. Additional discussion of duct detectors and HVAC system operation, as well as a
Sequence of Operations, is in Appendix D of this report.
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Figure # 49. Basement Initiating Device Locations
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Figure # 50. Floor 1 Initiating Device Locations
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Figure # 51. Floor 2 Initiating Device Locations
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Figure # 52. Floor 3 Initiating Device Locations
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Figure # 53. Floor 4 Initiating Device Locations
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Figure # 54. Floor 5 Initiating Device Locations
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Location, spacing and placement of fire detection devices
Location, spacing and placement of the fire detection devices installed in the building, and compliance
with the requirements of the National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
This report developed a design for the location, spacing, and placement of the fire detection
devices in compliance with the requirements of the National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. In doing so,
several assumptions were made:
1. Assume smooth, flat 10’ ceilings.
2. From NFPA 99, 16.7.3 Smoke Detectors, this report designs the smoke detector system in
accordance with NFPA 72.
3. From NFPA 101, 9.1.5 Health Care, this report references Chapters 18 and 19 for requirements.
4. From NFPA 101, 9.6 Fire Detection, Alarm, and Communications Systems, this report references
see Chapters 18 and 19 for requirements.
By 27.6.2.1.7, a publicly accessible alarm box is placed at the main entrance.
This report set the smoke detector spacing according to 17.7.3.2.3.1, with a nominal 30’ spacing and
coverage so distances are equal to or less than 0.7 times the nominal 30’ spacing between any
detectors. Additional guidance can be found in Annex A, e.g. Figure A.17.6.3.1.1(h) Smoke or Heat
Detector Spacing Layout in Irregular Areas.
This report also set smoke detector spacing based on 17.6.3.1, 17.7.3, 17.7.6.3.3, Table 17.7.6.3.3.2,
23.8.5.4.4, A.17.6.3.1.1, A.17.6.3.1.3.1, A.17.7.3.1 to A.17.7.3.7.88, A.17.7.6.3.3, B.4. This report also
reviewed the following code references sections for detector location and spacing on ceilings: 17.6.3,
17.7.3, 29.5.1.3.1, 29.5.1.3.2, 29.8.3.1 to 29.8.3.4, 29.8.4, A.17.6.3.1.1 to A.17.6.3.6, A.17.7.3.1 to
A.17.7.3.7.8, A.29.5.1.3.1, A.29.8.3.1 to A.29.8.3.4(11), A.29.8.4, Annex B. A plan view of the device
placement is shown in Figures 55 – 60.
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Figure # 55. Basement Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Figure # 56. Floor 1 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Figure # 57. Floor 2 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Figure # 58. Floor 3 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Figure # 59. Floor 4 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Figure # 60. Floor 5 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Fire Detection Devices
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Fire Alarm System Types and Requirements
Type of Fire Alarm System
Cut sheets describing the model, make, equipment that is connected are attached at the end of
this report. This report designed for a protected premises (local), while also selecting equipment to lay a
foundation that may be incorporated into upgrades/expansions (e.g. emote supervising station).
Requirements for the Disposition of Alarm, Supervisory and Trouble Signals
Alarm, Supervisory and Trouble Signals are defined in NFPA 72-201 (3.3.58.1.1, 3.3.58.1.3, and
3.3.58.1.4 respectively). This report also includes discussions from FPE 522 below:

Alarm: in general, alarm signals mean that there is a fire condition. Someone pulls the fire
alarm, you get a sprinkler water flow, a smoke detector activates. Fire pump starts running
(falls in the middle, can treat as a supervisory signal). More information in 23.8.5.1.
Supervisory: is your system in its normal operating condition? Are the valves open (valve
tamper switches)? Do we have adequate air pressure, do we have adequate water
temperature, etc. More information in 23.8.5.6.
Trouble: the system monitoring itself, annunciating if it is an off-normal situation, where it
cannot perform its functionality.
From NFPA 72-2016 and class, this report has the following information for disposition
(additional details in the code):

Table A26.1
26.1.1
26.2.1 Alarm signal disposition
26.2.2 Other signal disposition
(1) alarm (26.3.7.1, 26.3.7.2)
warning of fire danger that requires immediate action
(2) supervisory (26.3.7.3)
action is needed in connection with the operation of other fire protection systems that are
being monitored by the fire alarm system
(3) trouble
fault in a monitored circuit or component of the fire alarm system or the disarrangement of the
primary of secondary power supply
Alarm Notification Appliances
Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
This report uses strobe lights as the alarm notification devices in this building. These devices are
placed per the IFC, IBC, NFPA 72, NFPA 70, NFPA 99 Health Care Facilities Code, NFPA 101 Life Safety
Code. The presence of these devices—and the lack of horn alarm notification devices—was set in
accordance with these codes.
This report does not use any audible alarm notification devices in the notification design. This is
permitted by code for the occupancy, and is consistent with the principles of life safety. This is because
it is reasonable to assume many patients in this hospital will be unable to self-evacuate (as a result of
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whatever treatments they have led them to the hospital in the first place). With that in mind, an audio
notification does not serve its purpose in notifying occupants of a fire so that they can move to safe
location, whether that is a shelter or out of the building. Instead, this might have the contrary effect of
creating panic (perhaps unduly, in the case of false alarms) and causing difficulties for the staff in
calming and moving the patients. Instead, this report relies on the presence of a trained staff, following
emergency plans as required in the IFC and IBC.
This design does include the installation of visual strobe light alarm notification devices at
staff/nurse control stations on each floor, as well as in corridors on floors that would likely have ablebodied visitors (first two floors of the building, which house visitor registration, the pharmacy, and the
top floor, which has classrooms). A plan view of the appliance placement is shown below in Figures 61 –
66.
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Figure # 61. Basement Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 62. Floor 1 Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 63. Floor 2 Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 64. Floor 3 Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 65. Floor 4 Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 66. Floor 5 Types and Locations of Alarm Notification Devices
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Location, spacing and placement of the alarm notification appliances installed in the building, and
compliance with the requirements of the National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
This report developed a design for the location, spacing, and placement of alarm notification
appliances in compliance with the requirements of the National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. In doing
so, this report use the same assumptions that were made for initiating devices for alarm notification
appliances. Additionally, this report assumes no audio reverberations (though this does not directly
apply here, since this report has chosen to use a private mode alarm system for a hospital, Institutional
Group I-2 Condition 2 occupancy).
This report set the visible notification appliance spacing based on 18.5.5.4, 18.5.5.5, A.18.5.5.4,
and A.18.5.5.5.
There are also parts of the IFC and IBC that address this issue, including:
[F] 907.2.6 Group I.
A manual fire alarm system that activates the occupant notification system in accordance with Section
907.5 shall be installed in Group I occupancies. An automatic smoke detection system that activates the
occupant notification system in accordance with Section 907.5 shall be provided in accordance with
Sections 907.2.6.1, 907.2.6.2 and 907.2.6.3.3.
Exceptions:
2. Occupant notification systems are not required to be activated where private mode signaling installed
in accordance with NFPA 72 is approved by the fire code official and staff evacuation responsibilities are
included in the fire safety and evacuation plan required by Section 404 of the International Fire Code.
[F] 907.5.2.1 Audible alarms.
Audible alarm notification appliances shall be provided and emit a distinctive sound that is not to be
used for any purpose other than that of a fire alarm.
Exceptions:
1. Audible alarm notification appliances are not required in critical care areas of Group I-2,
Condition 2 occupancies that are in compliance with Section 907.2.6, Exception 2.
2. A visible notification appliance installed in a nurses' control station or other continuously
attended staff location in a Group I-2, Condition 2 suite shall be an acceptable alternative to the
installation of audible alarm notification appliances throughout the suite in a Group I-2,
Condition 2 occupanices that are in compliance with Section 907.2.6, Exception 2.
3. Where provided, audible notification appliances located in each enclosed occupant evacuation
elevator lobby in accordance with Section 3008.9.1 shall be connected to a separate notification
zone for manual paging only.
[F] 907.5.2.3 Visible alarms.
Visible alarm notification appliances shall be provided in accordance with Sections 907.5.2.3.1 through
907.5.2.3.3
Exceptions:
2. Visible alarm notification appliances shall not be required in exists as defined in Chapter 2.
3. Visible alarm notification appliances shall not be required in elevator cars.
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4. Visual alarm notification appliances are not required in critical area areas of Group I-2, Condition 2
occupancies that are in compliance with Section 907.2.6, Exception 2.
This is in agreement with NFPA 101:
9.6.3.6.3 Where occupants are incapable of evacuating themselves because of age, physical or mental
disabilities, or physical restraint, all of the following shall apply:
(1) The private operating mode, as described in NFPA 72 shall be permitted to be used.
(2) Only the attendants and other personnel required to evacuate occupants from a zone, area, floor, or
building shall be required to be notified.
(3) Notification of personnel as specified in 9.6.3.6.3 (2) shall include means to readily identify the zone,
area, floor, or building in need of evacuation.
A plan view of the device placement is shown below in Figures 67 – 72.
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Figure # 67. Basement Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 68. Floor 1 Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 69. Floor 2 Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 70. Floor 3 Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
123

Figure # 71. Floor 4 Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
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Figure # 72. Floor 5 Spacing of Alarm Notification Devices
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As desired by stakeholders, audible alarms may be installed per the requirements of Chapter 18
of NFPA 72-2016, and A.18.4.3 and Table A.18.4.3. Code references are provided here, and examples of
their application to portions of the first two floors of this project building are shown below.
A.18.4.3 The typical average ambient sound level for the occupancies specified in Table A.18.4.3
(shown as Table # 28 below) are intended only for design guidance purposes. The typical average
ambient sound levels specified should not be used in lieu of actual sound level measurements.
Sound levels can be significantly reduced due to distance and losses through building elements.
Every time the distance from the source doubles, the sound level decreases by about 6 decibels (dB).
Audible notification appliances are typically rated by manufacturers’ and testing agencies at 10 ft from
the appliance. Subsequently, at a distance of 20 ft from an audible appliance rated at 84 dBA, the sound
level might be reduced to 78 dBA. At a closed door, the loss might be about 10 dB to 24 dB or more
depending on construction. If the opening around the door is sealed, this might result in a loss of 22 dB
to 34 dB or more.
Table # 28. Average Ambient Sound Level According to Location from NFPA 72-2016
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Figure # 73. Basement Horn/Strobes
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In the above example, Figure 73, a horn/strobe notification device might be placed in the large
room at the west corner of the building, and the corridors. The device placement in the room, and audio
and visible settings are based on public mode audible requirements, including 18.4.3.1, the 6 dBA ruleof-thumb from A.18.4.3, Table A.18.4.3 Average Ambient Sound Level According to Location, and Table
18.5.5.4.1(a) Room Spacing for Wall-Mounted Visible Appliances. The horn/strobes in the corridors
followed many of the same code requirements, as well as 18.5.5.5 Spacing in Corridors, particularly
18.5.5.5.3 and 18.5.5.5.5.

128

Figure # 74. Floor 1 Horn/Strobes
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In the above example, Figure 74, a horn/strobe notification device might be placed in the large
hallway by the main entrance, along the north-west side of the building. The device placement in the
room, and audio and visible settings are based on public mode audible requirements, including 18.4.3.1,
the 6 dBA rule-of-thumb from A.18.4.3, Table A.18.4.3 Average Ambient Sound Level According to
Location, and Table 18.5.5.4.1(a) Room Spacing for Wall-Mounted Visible Appliances. In places where
the hallway narrowed to 20 ft or less, settings based on 18.5.5.5 Spacing in Corridors, particularly
18.5.5.5.3 and 18.5.5.5.5, were used.
Emergency Communication Systems
Analysis of the expected performance of the audible and visible notification appliances based on their
location, spacing and placement
The expected performance of audible notification appliances is not applicable to this design,
because this report has chosen to use a private alarm mode that does not use any audible notification
appliances. Background information regarding this is in the previous section, Alarm Notification
Appliances.
The visible notification appliances have been designed to comply with Chapter 18 of NFPA 722016. Additional equipment may be considered to more effectively aid in EVACS. This is discussed in the
following subsection.
Proposed revised speaker layout that ensures intelligibility for a voice system
In order to implement EVACS, a speaker system would need to be installed. As a rule-of-thumb
covered in class, there should be a speaker at a linear distance of twice the ceiling height from each
other. For this hospital with a 10’ ceiling height, this would correspond to a nominal spacing of 20’. This
report would use this nominal spacing in corridors and common areas, while most bedrooms are small
enough that a single speaker could be used. Note, speakers can be used for regular public
announcements, or to page doctors, nurses, and other occupants in non-fire situations.
To complement the auditory EVACS system, a series of visual screens for mass notification
systems (MNS) that would normally display other information might also be considered. This would be
in the same vein as airport terminal screens that display information under normal conditions, but can
be used to display fire and evacuation information when the need arises. Such a system can help in
communicating with those that are deaf or hearing impaired.
More information on speakers can be found in 18.8.1, 23.8.4.5, 24.4.2.2.1, 24.4.6, 24.4.8.4,
A.18.8.1.2, A.24.4.2.2.2, A.24.4.6.1, and F.1. High power speaker array (HPSA) information is found in
24.6.5 to 24.6.9, and A.24.6.5 to A.24.6.9.
Intelligibility requirements are set forth in 24.3.1.2, A.24.3.1, and A.24.3.1.2.
Power Requirements for Fire Alarm and Communication Systems
Secondary Power Supply Requirements for the Fire Alarm System
This report uses NFPA 70, NFPA 72, and what was presented in Cal Poly FPE 522 to calculate the
secondary power supply requirements for the fire alarm system.
First, this report considers plan views and riser diagrams for the initiating devices and
notification appliances in Figures 75 – 86 below. Note, abbreviations are used here. More
conventionally, a typical room or floor plan and riser diagram may be prepared.
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Figure # 75. Basement Riser Diagram
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Figure # 76. Floor 1 Riser Diagram
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Figure # 77. Floor 2 Riser Diagram
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Figure # 78. Floor 3 Riser Diagram
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Figure # 79. Floor 4 Riser Diagram
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Figure # 80. Floor 5 Riser Diagram
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Figure # 81. Floor 5 One-Line Diagram
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Figure # 82. Floor 4 One-Line Diagram
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Figure # 83. Floor 3 One-Line Diagram
139

Figure # 84. Floor 2 One-Line Diagram
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Figure # 85. Floor 1 One-Line Diagram
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Figure # 86. Basement One-Line Diagram
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This report then examines two scenarios: first, with private mode operation as shown in Table
29 below, then considering using sounder bases for the smoke detectors as a future audible alarm
devices as shown in Table 30 below. Note, this report assumes the use of high dBA alarm bases on 24
Vdc in non-reverberant rooms.

Table # 29. Secondary Power Supply Requirements, Private Mode
Equipment
Quantity
Supervisory Current
Alarm Current (in
(in amps)
amps)
Unit
Total
Unit
Total
1
Manual Pull 21
0.000396 0.008316 0.00068 0.01428
Station
2
Smoke
1100
0.000045 0.045
0.000045 0.045
Detectors
3
Strobes
72
0.063
4.536
Sub-totals (in amps)
0.057816
4.59978
Time Factor
24 hour
24
standby
5 minutes in
0.08333
alarm
Standby
0.057816 x 24 =
Amphours
1.387584
Alarm
4.59978 x 0.0833 =
Amphours
0.383315
System
1.387584 + 0.383315
Amphours
= 1.770899
Plus 25%
1.770899 x 1.25 =
Derating
2.213624
Under a private mode scenario, a secondary power supply of at least 2.213624… ~ 2.3 amphours
would be needed.
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Table # 30. Secondary Power Supply Requirements, Public Mode
Equipment
Quantity
Supervisory Current
Alarm Current (in
(in amps)
amps)
Unit
Total
Unit
Total
1
Manual Pull 21
0.000396 0.008316 0.00068 0.01428
Station
2
Smoke
1100
0.018
19.8
0.000045 0.045
Detectors
3
Alarm Base
1100
0.041
45.1
4
Strobes
72
0.063
4.536
Sub-totals (in amps)
19.80832
69.45028
Time Factor
24 hour
24
standby
5 minutes in
0.08333
alarm
Standby
19.80832 x 24 =
Amphours
475.3996
Alarm
69.45028 x 0.0833
Amphours
= 5.787523
System
475.3996 + 5.787523
Amphours
= 481.1871
Plus 25%
481.1871 x 1.25 =
Derating
601.4839
Under a public mode scenario, a secondary power supply of at least 601.4839 … ~ 602 amphours
would be needed.
Note, analysis of NACs (wire gauge, length, voltage drop, etc.) and discussions around the pros
and cons of centralized and decentralized batteries are not covered here, but should be covered with all
stakeholders.
Commissioning and Inspection, Testing and Maintenance (ITM) of Alarm Systems
Record of Completion
Record of Completion forms, to be filled out per NFPA 72 after system installation, are included
as another attachment to this report. Refer to Chapter 7 (particularly 7.5) of NFPA 72 for more
information.
Inspection, Test and Maintenance Requirements for the Fire Alarm System and Components
Inspection, Test and Maintenance forms, to be filled out per NFPA 72 after system installation,
are included as another attachment to this report. Refer to Chapter 14 of NFPA 72 for more information.
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Conclusion
This report aims to serve as a basic fire alarm system design for the Baylor, Scott & White
Hospital in College Station, TX. This is a basic design, which does not explicitly list other systems that are
expected to be present (such as sprinklers and PA speakers) that could also be integrated to form a
more complete alarm system (through the use of sprinkler water flow devices, and the use of PA
speakers for EVACS). Besides various NFPA codes and the International Fire Code and International
Building Code, this report draws from the material presented in FPE 522 by Professor Mower and
Professor Simonian. Turning from active fire protection systems to passive ones, this report will examine
the structural fire protection aspects of this building in the next section.
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Structural
Introduction
Structural Fire Protection is important in the overall Life Safety Plan for Health Care occupancies.
The survivability of the structure, and spaces such as areas of refuge, stairwells, and means of fire
service access are critical. The building’s structural integrity is addressed by the construction type and
protective measures. Exterior and interior construction types will be selected by several factors
(proximity to other structures, type of occupancy, etc.) and are outlined by code. Spray-on insulation on
steel structural members are designed to help keep the structure stable during a fire. Rated fire barriers
and smoke barriers (and properly sealed penetrations through them) are designed to contain the spread
of fire and smoke to allow occupants more time to safely evacuate.
This section of the report examines the proscriptive structural fire protection engineering
aspects of the Baylor, Scott and White Medical Center in College Station, TX. The 2018 edition of the
International Building Code serves as the governing code, and material from the Cal Poly Structural Fire
Protection class, FPE 524, is also used. This report assumes that this building is of Type I-A construction,
and that it is equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system.

Body
Required Construction Classification
Through examination of this building at the requirements of Chapter 5 of IBC-2018, it can
quickly be found that the building is restricted to either at Type I-A or Type I-B. These construction types
allow for unlimited building areas (Table 506.2) for the occupancies in the building, and the allowable
building height above grade (Table 504.3) is well above that of the building. The key factor to consider is
the allowable number of stories above grade (Table 504.4). Analysis finds that the ‘closest’ issue to a
proscriptive limit is the 5 floor restriction for I-2 occupancies for Type I-B construction. For Type I-A
construction, many restrictions are ‘Unlimited,’ rather than a set floor area or height. Given the
potential for future expansion or construction, this report assumes that the building is of Type I-A
construction.
Table 31 below shows the construction materials for the building. Because access to detailed
structural plans was not available for this report, general assumptions were made as to what materials
were used, based on engineering judgement in conjunction with personal work experiences with
hospitals. Additionally, more specific assumptions will be made for the purposes of calculations later in
this report, and such assumptions will be flagged at that time.
Building Element
Columns
Beams
Floor Assembly
Roof Assembly
Exterior Walls
Interior Walls

Table 31. Construction Material
Construction Material
Steel, I-beam, W-shape, various
Steel, I-beam, W-shape, various
Concrete slab, thickness to be set by structural
engineer
Concrete slab, thickness to be set by structural
engineer
Curtain wall, metal composite material (MCM)
Gypsum board over metal or wood studs, e.g.
3/4” sheetrock over metal/wood 2”x4”s
146

Door Openings
Joists
Penetrations
Partitions

Door openings that are compliant with Section
716 of IBC-2018, with ratings as required by code
Steel, I-beam, W-shape, various
Penetrations protected per Section 714 of IBC2018, e.g. fire caulk or rated assemblies
Construction as required by code. Note, smoke
partitions should comply with Section 710 of IBC2018 (e.g. Corridor walls, Section 407.3 of IBC2018). See also Sections 708 and 709

Fire Resistance Requirements for Building Elements
The requirements for fire-resistance rating requirements for building elements are found in
Table 601 of IBC-2018. The following table, Table 32, summarizes the fire-resistive rating requirements
for different building elements of this hospital as a Type I-A building.
Table 32. Fire Resistance Requirements for Building Elements
Building Element
Fire-Resistance Rating (Hours)
Primary Structural Frame
3
Bearing Walls – Interior
3
Bearing Walls – Exterior
3
Non-bearing Walls and Partitions – Exterior
0
Non-bearing Walls and Partitions – Interior
0
Floor Construction and Associated Secondary
2
Members
Roof Construction and Associated Secondary
2
Members
Note, for exterior walls, the rating is based on Table 602 of IBC-2018, and fire separation
distance. From satellite pictures of the building, this report assumes that the fire separation distance is
over 30 feet, and so 0 hours of fire-resistance rating is required for code for all construction types and all
occupancies.
Table 508.4 of IBC-2018 includes information on required separation of occupancies in hours.
However, it is assumed that this building has non-separated occupancies per the requirements of
Section 508.3 of IBC-2018, with care especially given to Section 508.3.1.2 for Group I-2, Condition 2
occupancies, which this building is (as it is a hospital). Given that, all the most restrictive requirements of
individual occupancies for height, number of stories, and area applied to the all occupancies as a whole.
Note, given this design, the choice of a Type I-A construction is relevant as it may help preclude further
difficulties beyond future expansion. This is because, as discussed earlier, the 5-floor restriction of I-2
occupancies for Type I-B construction would now apply to all occupancies, and any occupancy of the
roof would be prohibited, which may not be desirable to the design team or tenants. Additionally, It is
the author’s understanding that non-separated occupancies are not uncommon for hospitals, which
gives further credit to this design choice.
Besides the requirements above, the building also has the following requirements:
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Elevator shafts – 2-hour rating per Section 713.4 of IBC-2018, because the elevator shafts
connect 4 stories or more.
Exit stairs – 2-hour rating per Section 1023.2 of IBC-2018, because the exit stairs connect 4
stories or more.
Exit corridors – 1-hour rating per Section 1024.3 of IBC-2018

Table 509 of IBC-2018 also contains pertinent requirements for Group I-2 occupancies. Specifically, the
following rooms require 1-hour fire resistive ratings:






Laundry rooms over 100 sq. ft.
Patient rooms equipped with padded surfaces.
Physical plant maintenance shops
Waste and linen collection rooms with containers that have an aggregate volume of 10 cubic
feet or greater
Storage rooms over 100 sq. ft.

Fire Safety Strategy
The fire safety strategy of fire resistance in the building is based on implicit safety, or
prescriptive-based design. Such a strategy is typical in the United States of America, as opposed to more
explicit safety, or performance-based designs that are commonly found in other countries such as New
Zealand.
Fire Resistance Diagram
Fire-resistance diagrams for each of the floors are shown in Figures 87 – 92 below. The primary
areas shown are for the elevator shafts, exit stairs, and exit corridors. Building elements and other
special cases for Group I-2 occupancies identified above should be labeled once that information
becomes available. Note, the fire-resistance ratings are to be taken at the perimeter of the shaded
areas.

148

Figure 87. Basement Fire Resistance Diagram
149

Figure 88. Floor 1 Fire Resistance Diagram
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Figure 89. Floor 2 Fire Resistance Diagram
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Figure 90. Floor 3 Fire Resistance Diagram
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Figure 91. Floor 4 Fire Resistance Diagram
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Figure 92. Floor 5 Fire Resistance Diagram
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Conclusion
Structural fire protection engineering is important in increasing the chances of occupant safety
during a fire. As a largely passive system, the benefits of these systems will continue even in the absence
of water or electricity. From analysis of the material available, with reasonable assumptions “filling in
the blanks,” it can be determined that that there are no deficiencies with respect to structural fire
protection features of this facility. However, this should be verified in the field. Additionally, on-going
fire protection inspections should be undertaken, and, in relation to structural fire protection, care
should be taken to ensure that that proscribed systems and assemblies are maintained, e.g. that
penetrations through barriers are properly sealed. In addition to the construction material analysis in
this structural fire protection section, flammability assessment methods are important to the overall fire
protection strategy of a building, and this report covers those methods in the next section.
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Flammability Assessment Methods
Introduction
While a building may be designed and built to specification, the fire protection engineering
systems may be compromised in several ways. The material used may not function as intended, whether
due to defects or previously unknown issues. An example of this is the metal composite materials used
for exterior cladding, in which an expanded hydrocarbon core is encapsulated between metal sheets.
These materials are generally thought to have played a role in the Dubai Torch Tower fires, and the UK
Grenfell Tower fire. Furniture, fixtures, and equipment may also compromise the fire protection
engineering systems as designed. Too large of a fire load can overwhelm systems, and dramatically
reduce ASET for occupants. Flammability assessment methods, and other tests, can help determine the
performance and impact of materials used to build and fill this project building.

Body
As discussed in the egress section of this report, flammability characteristics of building
materials are set forth in the code.
Below is an excerpt from the egress section on flammability.
Interior Finish Requirements for Exits, Corridors and Other Spaces
The interior finish requirements for exits, corridors, and other spaces are primarily
governed by NFPA 101 in 7.1.4.1, 7.1.4.2, and Chapter 10.2 (including 10.2.3, 10.2.3.4, 10.2.7.1,
10.2.7.3, 10.2.7.2., 10.2.7.4, Table A.10.2.2, among others).
From Table A.10.2.2, new Health Care occupancies are required to have Class A interior
wall and ceiling finishes (flame spread index, 0-25 (new applications); smoke developed index, 0450) for exits, exit access corridors, and other spaces. There are allowances for Class B interior
wall and ceiling finishes (flame spread index, 26-75 (new applications); smoke developed index,
0-450) for the lower portion of corridor walls or in small individual rooms, but no such allowance
for corridors. This report also finds that exits and exit access corridors are required to have Class
I or II interior floor finishes (critical radiant flux, not less than 0.45 W/cm2 for Class I, critical
radiant flux, not more than 0.22 W/cm2, but less than 0.45 W/cm2 for Class II), but there are no
requirements for floor finishes for other spaces.
Flammability assessment methods are discussed in the IBC—and were also discussed in Cal Poly
FPE 503 and 504—and cover ASTM and NFPA standards such as the Steiner Tunnel Test. As a whole,
they seek to quantify the performance of material under set parameters to predict their behavior in a
fire.
While it is possible to test each material and item, it is usually more practical and economical to
purchase materials that have already been ‘listed’ by organizations such as UL, Underwriters
Laboratories, instead of testing new items. There are cases where flammability assessment methods
may be required, such as determining fuel loads for design fires under 5.5.3.6 of NFPA 101.

Conclusion
Flammability assessment methods are a powerful tool for the profession of fire protection
engineering. They allow the industry to determine the performance of materials in a fire, and can help
engineers and companies make choices as to what will be used to construct and fill buildings. They may
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also be used when evaluating unlisted materials or to investigate alternative methods. However, it is not
anticipated that flammability assessment methods will be used specifically for this building. This is not
the case for the next section, as this report transitions from passive fire protection measures back to
active fire protection measures, and examines the smoke control design for this building.
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Smoke Control
Introduction
Smoke control is a very important part of the approach to life safety for hospitals. There are
several code requirements for new health care occupancies and new assembly occupancies that this
report will examine here.

Body
Smoke control for this building involves a combination of active and passive measures. Active
measures include stairway and elevator shaft pressurization, and smoke dampers on the HVAC systems.
Passive measures include smoke compartments and smoke partitions.
Several sections of the code highlight the need to document smoke control for the building. This
includes 18.7.7 of NFPA 101 for new health care occupancies. This is especially true for new assembly
occupancies, where a life safety narrative (12.4.1.4.2 NFPA 101), facility management and operational
plans (12.4.1.5.2 NFPA 101), and records (12.4.1.5.3 NFPA 101).
Additionally, IBC has requirements for separation and smoke barriers. Under 407.4.4.2 IBC, care
suites are separated from other portions of the building, including other care suites, by smoke
partitions. Under 407.5 IBC, smoke barriers are required to separate every story of the building into at
least two smoke compartments. This is in alignment with 18.3.7.1 of NFPA 101, and this section of NPFA
101 places further restrictions on the size of such smoke compartments (e.g. 22,500 sq. ft. limit for
compartments where patient sleeping rooms are configured for two or more patients). From the
occupancy classifications and research for Health Occupancies, this report makes an educated
assumption that the lower three floors (Basement, Floor 1, and Floor 2) satisfy the requirements of the
40,000 sq. ft. limit for smoke compartments (either because they contain patient sleeping rooms
configured for no more than one patient, or they have no patient sleeping rooms at all), and that the
upper three floors (Floor 3, Floor 4, and Floor 5) satisfy the requirements of the 22,500 sq. ft. limit for
smoke compartments. In both cases, the travel distance from any point to reach a door in the smoke
barrier does not exceed 200 ft. For real-world projects, this would need to be verified with stakeholders
such as the architect, owner, and AHJ.
Figures 93 – 98 below show the division of each floor into smoke compartments, as well as the
smoke compartments around each care suite.

158

Figure # 93. Basement Smoke Control
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Figure # 94. Floor 1 Smoke Control
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Figure # 95. Floor 2 Smoke Control
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Figure # 96. Floor 3 Smoke Control
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Figure # 97. Floor 4 Smoke Control
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Figure # 98. Floor 5 Smoke Control
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Per 9.3.1 of NFPA 101, smoke control is designed, installed, inspected, tested, and maintained in
accordance with NFPA 92, NFPA 204, or other sources as approved by the AHJ. Additionally, under 9.3.4
of NFPA 101, smoke control systems are automatically activated by sprinkler waterflow or smoke
detection systems, and also have the ability to be manually operated. The requirements for engineering
analysis and calculations of active or passive smoke control is set forth in 12.4.1.4.4 of NFPA 101.

Conclusion
One may consider that there are both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ components of smoke control, that
together form a coherent approach smoke control for life safety of health facilities. Some of the passive
measures are in the construction of the smoke partitions and smoke barriers. Some of the active
measures include documentation and staff training. Both are necessary components to smoke control in
a health care occupancy. This concludes the prescriptive-based analysis of this hospital, and the
performance-based analysis is covered next.
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Performance-based Analysis
Introduction
The next several sections of this report aims to examine the Baylor, Scott, and White Medical
Center, College Town, TX location through the lens of a performance-based analysis. Note, this
performance-based design analysis conservatively assumes that an important fire protection feature is
not present; specifically, it is assumed that the door to the room with the fire is opened to the corridor.
The reason for this is that in researching other Cal Poly presentations and reports, if the door to the fire
room were to remain closed, the tenability criteria for occupants would be maintained so that ASET >>
RSET. Some of these same reports and presentations show that when those same models are rerun with
the doors open, whether ASET is greater or less than RSET comes into question. It is for this reason that
this report focuses on scenarios when the doors are open in this analysis. Additionally, the model
explores the difference between a noncontrolled and a suppression controlled-fire.

Objectives
The life safety of occupants—patients, staff, and the public—is the paramount objective
considered in this performance-based analysis.

Criteria
ASET should be greater than or equal to 150% of RSET. ASET in turns is based on tenability
criteria for occupants, which is determined based on several categories below. These criteria were also
discussed in the egress section, and they are included here again for convenience. This report
summarizes the criteria that will be considered in the fire models in Table # 29 below.
Table # 33. Tenability Criteria
Tenability Criteria
Visibility
Heat
Radiation
Carbon Monoxide FED

Limit
10 m
60 C
2.5 kW/m2
20% COHb
(typically 1000 – 3000 ppm CO)

Note, based on the calculations and computer models from egress class Cal Poly FPE 521 and
smoke management and special hazards class Cal Poly FPE 552, visibility serves as a ‘canary in the
coalmine’ for tenability: if visibility is satisfied, the other criteria are usually satisfied during fires such as
those that will be considering for this performance-based analysis. Also, this report assumes that the
visibility limit for tenable conditions is 10 m, which seems to be a good middle ground of the range of
values presented in Table 61.3 and Table 61.4 of the SFPE Handbook.
Tenability Performance Criteria
Several different sources are used to set tenability limits for the project building. Of importance
is the need to take into account the occupant characteristics associated with this hospital. This report
categorizes the tenability criterial into three broad categories: visibility/smoke density, heat effects, and
toxic/irritant gases.
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Visibility and Smoke Density
For visibility/smoke density, Chapter 61 of the SFPE Handbook is the primary reference that is
relied upon in this report. From Table 61.3 and Table 61.4, this report assumes occupants who are
unfamiliar with the inside of the building as a conservative estimate, and uses a smoke density
(extinction coefficient) of 0.15 1/m and visibility of 13 m (42.6 ft). Note, these limits are close to those
proposed by fire researchers such as Kawagoe (0.1 1/m) and the Los Angeles Fire Department (45 ft,
13.5 m).
Heat Effects
For heat effects, Chapter 63 of the SFPE Handbook is the primary reference that is relied upon in
this report, and Table 63.20, Table 63.28, Table 63.29 are used extensively.
This report assumes that tenability limits for the typical occupant are breached if occupants are
exposed to radiation intensity of 2.5 kW/m2 for more than 30 seconds, or if occupants experience
exposure to convection of 100oC at a humidity of less than 10 % H2O for more than 12 minutes. Because
of the potential weakened state of patients, this report can apply a safety factor of 20% - 50% to these
limits, as agreed upon by stakeholders (client, AHJ, etc.).
Toxic and Irritant Gases
For toxic and irritant gases, this report uses the materials from the Cal Poly SLO FPE Program,
and Chapter 63 of the SFPE Handbook (including the Appendix, and relevant equations such as 63.15,
63.35, 63.38, 63.39, 63.18, Table 63.4, Figure 63.20, Table 63.10, etc.) to set limits and calculate the FED,
Fractional Effective Dose.
As discussed in Cal Poly SLO’s FPE Program and in the SFPE Handbook, Chapter 63, pages 2352 –
2356, the exposure dose (percent COHb) for incapacitation, D, varies depending on the level of activity.
From the SFPE Handbook, Figure 63.20 indicates that, with other factors being equal, increasing levels of
activity lead to decreasing times to incapacitation. Similarly, Table 63.10 indicates increasing
carboxyhemoglobin concentrations with increasing levels of activity with other factors being equal.

167

This report uses D = 50 %COHb as the lethal level based on Table 63.4, and because “50 %COHb
is usually considered as an average lethal level” (SFPE Handbook, 5th ed., page 2347).
It is assumed that 40 %COHb would lead to loss of consciousness for healthy resting individuals,
but this loss of consciousness can occur at even lower levels for more susceptible resting subjects, and
lower levels can be dangerous for subjects with compromised cardiac function. However, it should be
noted that during the presentation of this report during the 2019 Cal Poly FPE Symposium, senior FPE’s
reported incidents of lethal CO concentrations for hospital patients that are approximately an order of
magnitude less than the 1000 – 3000 ppm CO that are typically considered the tenability limits for
healthy individuals.
For the reasons described in the previous paragraph, this report assumes that it is appropriate
to assume a tenability limit of 20 %COHb, 100 ppm HCN for 10 minutes (Table 63.12), and CO2 limits
should be examined based on the FED model, in conjunction with other gases.
For irritants, this report takes half of the levels from Table 2-6.12 of the NFPA Handbook (which
has been replicated in Table # 34 below):
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Table # 34. Irritant Gas Levels (ppm)
Gas
Limit (ppm)
HCl
100
HBr
100
HF
100
SO2
12
NO2
35
CH2CHO
2
HCHO
3

Methodology to Evaluate Building Performance Objectives under Section 502 of the LSC
In order to evaluate whether or not the building meets the performance objectives for
tenability, there are several methods in A.5.2.2. Of the four methods presented, it is in the report
author’s engineering judgement that Methods 3 (smoke layer will never descend below 6 feet above the
floor) and 4 (fire will not spread to occupied rooms) will be extremely difficult to achieve with such a
large and complex hospital building for this project, so this report will not use those methods. Of the
remaining two methods, Methods 1 (PFD, using tools such as FED) and 2 (evacuation before smoke layer
descends to below 6 feet above the floor) both have pros and cons associated with them.
Method 1 has the benefit of being more flexible in a way; there is no ‘red line’ like Method 2,
tying evacuation time to smoke level descent. Rather, FPE’s are allowed the freedom to use all manner
of tools available to them to prevent occupants from experiencing untenable conditions. The strength of
this method in the project is that FPE’s are able to use multiple strategies to protect occupants. The
weakness is that FPE’s must account for all variables that might threaten their safety, and ensure that no
tenability limits are breached.
Method 2 has a more straight-forward and easily measurable metric, and in conjunction with
the expectation of trained staff and horizontal exits, it is expected that the necessary evacuation time
can be achieved in this project building. While this method does not explicitly list protection from all
tenability criteria, it seems reasonable to assume that if the smoke layer does not descend below 6 feet,
other tenability criteria such as toxic gas concentration and visibility would also be met.
For these reasons, it is recommend that the client utilize Method 2 at this time to show that the
building meets performance objectives outlined in Section 502 of the LSC. Simultaneously, it is
understandable if the AHJ would require the use of Method 1 instead of Method 2. AHJ direction should
be solicited so that the correct methodology may be pursued.

Analysis
The basis of the performance-based analysis for this report is based on one of the smoke
compartments of Floor 4. The geometry is discussed further the design fire section below. This floor was
selected as a starting point as representative of an area of the hospital that would be the most likely to
be occupied by a greatest number of occupants needing assistance, relative to the staff and public who
could assist them.

169

Proposed Design Fires
This report considers two design fires, both of which are set on the 4th floor: a 4-person
workstation fire in an office, and a mattress fire in a patient bedroom. Figures of these two design fire
locations are shown in Figures # 99 – 103. The 4-person workstation fire is in an office at the plan northwest side of the fourth floor. The mattress fire is in a patient bedroom on the plan south side of the
fourth floor. For both design fire scenarios, it is assumed that both of these will draw on experimental
data from the SFPE Handbook. Specifically, data for these fires came from Table 26.19 and Table 26.16,
respectively. HRR curves and data were chosen so that the most conservative choices present were used
for the model.
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Figure # 99. Design Fire Diagram
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Figure # 100. Office Fire
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Figure # 101. Enlarged View of Office Fire
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Figure # 102. Bedroom Fire
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Figure # 103. Enlarged View of Bedroom Fire
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Fire Models
PyroSim and FDS were used to model both of the design fires and the resulting impact on
tenability criteria. Pathfinder was used to model the egress time for occupants in hospital beds, and
requiring two assistants to move the patients to safety.
Slice files were placed at the 6 feet level in PyroSim, and the model was run to see when
visibility dropped below 10 meters. Ceiling devices were also placed to gather data for smoke detector
and fire sprinkler activation. Three egress scenarios in Pathfinder were also run, each removing a
horizontal exit, until only one remained. Different egress scenarios were modeled because one of the
three horizontal exits leads to a stairwell, whereas the other two lead to the second smoke
compartment of Floor 4. It is likely that the majority of occupants would need to be evacuated to the
second smoke compartment rather than the stairwell. Additionally, a single horizontal exit to the second
smoke compartment was modeled to account for the scenario where a fire may be blocking access to
the other one (e.g. if there was a fire in a bedroom next to that exit, as was modeled in PyroSim).
The HRR curve used for the design fires in FDS was based on data from the SFPE Handbook. The
HRR curve for the office fire was based on the four-unit workstation of Figure 26.70 from the SFPE
Handbook, and the HRR curve for the bedroom fire was based on Figure 26.64. Note, the HRR curve for
the bedroom fire is for a king-size bed assembly. It is assumed that this can be used to model the
hospital beds in this building; perhaps even two of them in a single bedroom, which could conservatively
be assumed to be used as the design fire for the bedroom.
The fire models were run both as a non-controlled fire and a suppression-controlled fire (i.e. the
fire scenarios were run with and without fire sprinkler activation). For the suppression-controlled fire,
data from the non-controlled model was taken, and at the point that the ceiling device temperature
reaches lower end of the 175-225oF range for the fire sprinklers that have been selected is the point that
the report assumes that the sprinklers activate for the suppression-controlled iteration of this model. At
the time of sprinkler activation, the HRR of the fire is then held steady—instead of the appropriate alpha
t-squared fire ramping increase (based on a fast or ultrafast fire) to the maximum HRR from the SFPE
Handbook. This is accomplished by manually reading the HRR from the non-suppression controlled
model, then changing the maximum HRR from the one listed in the SFPE Handbook to the HRR at the
time of sprinkler activation.
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Pyrosim Office Fire
Based on the Office scenario, the visibility for this smoke compartment drops below 10 m for a
sizeable portion of the corridor between five and six minutes. It should be reiterated that this design fire
scenario is modeled with the office door open. The fire reaction is modeled as an oak wood reaction, as
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matching Table 36.11 of the SFPE Handbook, as an assumption that this closely resembles what the
workspace desk is constructed of. Relevant figures are shown below in Figures # 104 – 107.

PyroSim Bedroom Fire
Based on the Bedroom scenario, the visibility for this smoke compartment drops below 10 m for
a sizeable portion of the corridor between five and six minutes. It should be reiterated that this design
fire scenario is modeled with the bedroom door open. The fire reaction is modeled as a polyurethane
GM27 reaction, as matching Table 36.11 of the SFPE Handbook, as an assumption that this closely
resembles what the bed is constructed of. Relevant figures are shown below in Figures # 108 – 111.
Pathfinder Models
As discussed earlier, three Pathfinder models are considered: three exits, two exits, and one
exits. This is to account for the fact that one exit is to a stair, which is not useful for evacuating patients
in hospital beds, and that one of the remaining two horizontal exits may be blocked by a fire (which is
assumed to be the case in this report). The results are summarized in the following table, Table # 35,
and relevant figures are shown below in Figure # 112 – 114.
Scenario
Three Exits
Two Exits
One Exit

Table # 35. Pathfinder Results
Egress Time (seconds)
147.0
194.3
199.5
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Figure # 104. Office Fire, Noncontrolled, Visibility, 330 Seconds
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Figure # 105. Office Fire, Noncontrolled, Temperature, 500 Seconds
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Figure # 106. Office Fire, Suppression-Controlled, Visibility, 500 Seconds
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Figure # 107. Office Fire, Suppression-Controlled, Temperature, 500 Seconds
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Figure # 108. Bedroom Fire, Noncontrolled, Visibility, 260 Seconds
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Figure # 109. Bedroom Fire, Noncontrolled, Temperature, 500 Seconds
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Figure # 110. Bedroom Fire, Suppression-Controlled, Visibility, 260 Seconds
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Figure # 111. Bedroom Fire, Suppression-Controlled, Temperature, 500 Seconds
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= EXIT

Figure # 112. Three-Exit Evacuation
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= EXIT

Figure # 113. Two-Exit Evacuation
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= EXIT

Figure # 114. One-Exit Evacuation
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ASET vs RSET
RSET is based on the travel time, which is conservatively set as 199.5 seconds (the egress time
calculated for a single exit). As discussed in the egress section (and referenced in the SFPE handbook),
this report takes one minute as the premovement time for health care occupancies. Additionally, from
the two scenarios above, the FDS model showed find an alarm activation time of 85 seconds for the
office fire, and 129 seconds for the bedroom fire. Adding the premovement times, alarm activation
times, and egress times leads to a total RSET of 344.5 for the office fire, and 388.5 for the bedroom fire.
In comparison to the RSET times calculated above, the ASET was found to be between 300 and
360 seconds in both scenarios. The ASET times was calculated as the time a tenability criteria was
breached in the FDS models—specifically, the ASET time was found to be when the visibility dropped
below 10 meters. Considering that ASET should be equal to or greater than 150% of RSET, this would
imply that RSET should be between 200 and 240 seconds. The travel time alone is 199.5 seconds, and
adding the premovement time of 60 seconds drives this to 260 seconds, irregardless of detection and
notification time. For this reason, I would find that RSET exceeds ASET in both of the scenarios.

Structural Fire Analysis
Besides the question of ASET vs RSET, this report will also examine the structural fire protection
requirements of the building through a performance-based analysis. In addition to the two design fires
described above for the bedroom and the office, a hallway fire is also assumed, in order to present a
more challenging fire from a structural fire protection perspective. This hallway fire is assumed to take
place in the hallway outside of the bedroom fire location, assumes a row of beds lining the hallway as
the fuel load.

Design Fires
For the design fires, this report considers three general scenarios: a pair of patient beds catching
fire in a patient bedroom, a row patient beds catching fire in a long hallway, and a 4-person workstation
catching fire in an office. Data for all of these fires comes from the SFPE Handbook, 5th edition. Note,
the ignition source itself is not important for the purpose of this report, but it may be considered to be a
generic event, such overheating or damaged cell phone being charged on a bed, an e-cigarette system
malfunctioning, or other malfunction.

Bedroom Fire
It is assumed a bedroom fire involving patient beds on the west wing of floor 4 of the hospital
occurs, as one of the design fires. The report assumes that two patient beds in the bedroom are
involved, which is more conservative, and also allows the scenario to more closely match the data from
the SFPE Handbook.

Design Fire
Heat Release Rate
The heat release rate of the design fire is based on data from the SFPE Handbook, 5th edition.
The graph of HRR is shown below.
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Hallway Fire
It is assumed a hallway fire involving patient beds on west wing of floor 4 of the hospital occurs,
as one of the design fires.

Design Fire
Heat Release Rate
The heat release rate of the design fire is based on data from the SFPE Handbook, 5th edition.
The graph of HRR is shown below.
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Office Fire
It is assumed a fire involving a four-unit workstation in an office on the west wing of floor 4 of
the hospital occurs, as one of the design fires.

Design Fire
Heat Release Rate
The heat release rate of the design fire is based on data from the SFPE Handbook, 5th edition.
The graph of HRR is shown below.
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Heat Transfer
Boundary Conditions on the Structural Members
While it is assumed that the building is designed for implicit safety, this report also examines
standard design curves, such as ASTM E119, for boundary conditions on the structural members. The
report also considered the Margaret Law time equivalency to the standard fire resistance test and
Thomas plot with fuel load burning duration for the bedroom and office, and the traveling fire
methodology for the hallway fire. This report focuses on the Thomas plot with fuel load burning
duration for the bedroom and office, and the traveling fire methodology for the hallway.
The Biot Number for the steel structural members of W24x162 beams is calculated as:
Bi = Lch/k
Bi = (0.014033 m) x (20 W/m2-K) / (45.8 W/m-K)
Bi = 0.006128 << 1
Note, this report uses spreadsheets from Carboline to find W/D for W24x162 beams, 1.88 inches
and convert this to A/P by the ratio 144/490, and convert this to meters by the ratio 0.0254 m / in to
arrive at 0.014033 m. A/P (cross-sectional area of the beam / heated perimeter) is a normalized
equivalent to Lc (instead of the volume of the beam / heated surface area).
From the Biot Number calculation above, the W24x162 has been determined to be a thermally
thin material, and apply a lumped capacitance approach to find the boundary conditions on the
structural members. The boundary conditions on the structural members is assumed to be the
temperature of the gas layer from the fire, and is shown in the attached spreadsheets in Appendix E.
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Bedroom Fire
This report assumes that the bedroom is 5 meters by 5 meters, and 3.6 meters tall, with a 1
meter by 2 meter door. This report assumes general properties and variables that have been used in the
Cal Poly FPE 524 class and in the reference material for that class; these variables are listed in the
attached spreadsheet. By applying the calculations for Thomas Plot, this report conservatively applies a
700oC fire to the beam. This report also conservatively sets the exposure time towards the maximum
time from the SFPE Handbook HRR curve data, 20 minutes.
Hallway Fire
This report assumes the hallway is 50 meters long, 3.6 meters wide, and 3.6 meters tall. This
report assumes general properties and variables that have been used in the Cal Poly FPE 524 class and in
the reference material for that class; these variables are listed in the attached spreadsheets in Appendix
E. Using the traveling fire methodology, this report iterated through different possibilities to find the
most conservative values to use in this analysis.
Office Fire
This report assumes the office is 5 meters by 5 meters, and 3.6 meters tall, with a 1 meter by 2
meter door. This report assumes general properties and variables that have been used in the Cal Poly
FPE 524 class and in the reference material; these variables are listed in the attached spreadsheets in
Appendix E. By applying the calculations for Thomas Plot, this report conservatively applies a 700oC fire
to the beam. This report also conservatively set the exposure time towards the maximum time from the
SFPE Handbook HRR curve data, 25 minutes.
Structural Fire Protection Analysis
For the dead load, it is assumed that the building has a 100 mm thick concrete slab, with a
weight per unit area of 2.360 kN/m2, or approximately 50 psf. This is based on 2012 Bangladesh Building
Code (https://law.resource.org/pub/bd/bnbc.2012/gov.bd.bnbc.2012.06.02.pdf). This is also in line with
publications from the Housing and Urban Development Department of the United States of America,
which lists concrete (normal weight with light reinforcement) as having a density of 145-150 pcf
(https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/pdf/res2000_2.pdf). With 100 mm approximately 1/3 of a foot,
this also corresponds to 50 psf, as with the Bangladesh Building Code. The dead load that is assumed
also matches that of previous FPE 524 projects (example projects on shown on the FPE 524 Summer
2019 PolyLearn site).
From Table 1607.1 of IBC-2018, the uniform live loads for Hospitals range from 40 psf in patient
rooms, 60 psf for operation rooms and laboratories, and 80 psf for corridors above the first floor. From
this same table, other occupancy types found in the building (assembly, office, and stairs and exits) have
a uniform live load of 100 psf, so it appears that the 100 psf live load can be conservatively applied for
throughout all of the floors. Besides being conservative for the current configuration, this design will
allow occupants the flexibility to rearrange areas and occupancies without having to first modify the
structural elements of the building.
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Time to Failure
Bedroom Fire
For the bedroom fire, this report uses the Thomas Plot with the fuel load burning duration from
the SFPE handbook data as a compartment fire methodology to calculate if a failure time is reached for
insulated and non-insulated beams in the bedroom.
With Insulation
With insulation, the beam does not fail either in terms of moment capacity or deflection
adequacy. This is true even if the fire time is extended from 20 minutes to over 200 minutes. Graphs
demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire scenario are show below in
Figures 115 – 117. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that the structural fire protection
of the building is adequate for the bedroom fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 115. Bedroom Structural Member Boundary Condition, Insulated
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Figure # 116. Bedroom Structural Member Steel Temperature, Insulated
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Figure # 117. Bedroom Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Insulated
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Without Insulation
Without insulation, the beam does not fail either in terms of moment capacity or deflection
adequacy. This is true even if the fire time is extended from 20 minutes to over 200 minutes (a steadystate is reached). Graphs demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire
scenario are show below in Figures 118 – 120. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that
even without the structural fire protection of the building, the underlying strength of the structural
elements is adequate for the bedroom fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 118. Bedroom Structural Member Boundary Condition, Uninsulated
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Figure # 119. Bedroom Structural Member Steel Temperature, Uninsulated
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Figure # 120. Bedroom Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Uninsulated
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Hallway Fire
For the hallway fire, this report uses the Traveling Fire Methodology discussed in Cal Poly FPE
524 to evaluate if a failure time is reached for insulated and non-insulated beams in the hallway.
With Insulation
With insulation, the beam does not fail either in terms of moment capacity or deflection
adequacy. This is at a beam location of 22 meters from the start of the fire, which was iteratively
determined to be the most conservative position in terms of moment capacity decrease. Graphs
demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire scenario are show below in
Figures 121 – 123. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that the structural fire protection
of the building is adequate for the traveling hallway fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 121. Hallway Structural Member Boundary Condition, Insulated
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Figure # 122. Hallway Structural Member Steel Temperature, Insulated
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Figure # 123. Hallway Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Insulated
206

Without Insulation
Without insulation, the beam fails at approximately 396 seconds, or 6.6 minutes, in terms of
moment capacity, and the beam fails at approximately 600 seconds or 10 minutes in terms of deflection
adequacy. This is at a beam location of 0 meters from the start of the fire, which was iteratively
determined to be the most conservative position in terms of moment capacity decrease. Graphs
demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire scenario are show below in
Figures 124 – 126. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that without the structural fire
protection of the building, the underlying strength of the structural elements is not adequate for the
traveling hallway fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 124. Hallway Structural Member Boundary Condition, Uninsulated
208

Figure # 125. Hallway Structural Member Steel Temperature, Uninsulated
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Figure # 126. Hallway Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Uninsulated
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Office Fire
For the office fire, this report uses the Thomas Plot with the fuel load burning duration from the
SFPE handbook data as a compartment fire methodology to calculate if a failure time is reached for
insulated and non-insulated beams in the office.
With Insulation
With insulation, the beam does not fail either in terms of moment capacity or deflection
adequacy. This is true even if the fire time is extended from 20 minutes to over 200 minutes. Graphs
demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire scenario are show below in
Figures 127 – 129. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that the structural fire protection
of the building is adequate for the office fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 127. Office Structural Member Boundary Condition, Insulated
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Figure # 128. Office Structural Member Steel Temperature, Insulated
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Figure # 129. Office Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Insulated
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Without Insulation
Without insulation, the beam does not fail either in terms of moment capacity or deflection
adequacy. This is true even if the fire time is extended from 20 minutes to over 200 minutes. Graphs
demonstrating the moment capacity and deflection adequacy for this fire scenario are show below in
Figures 130 – 132. The result that may be drawn from these figures is that even without the structural
fire protection of the building, the underlying strength of the structural elements is adequate for the
office fire scenario used in this report.
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Figure # 130. Office Structural Member Boundary Condition, Uninsulated
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Figure # 131. Office Structural Member Steel Temperature, Uninsulated
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Figure # 132. Office Structural Member Steel Moment Capacity, Uninsulated
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Protection Scheme for Structural Members
This report assumes that the structural members will be W-shaped steel I-beams. This report
also assumes that the protection scheme will be spray-on applied insulative material, such as mineral
fiber or vermiculite plaster. This report assumes that a mineral fiber insulation was used, and that its
characteristics are:
Density: 300 kg/m3
Thermal Conductivity: 0.12 W/m-K
Specific Heat: 1200 J/kg-K
Moisture Content: 1%
Note, this report assumes that moisture content can be ignored, which is a more conservative
approach, because otherwise the Specific Heat would be modified around the 100oC point to account
for the latent heat of vaporization of water.
This report also assumes that the thickness of the insulation was calculated according to the
following equation for UL X829 mineral fiber insulation:
R = h[C1(W/D) + C2], where
R is the fire resistance rating (hours)
h is the insulation thickness (inches)
C1 and C2 are material constants for SRFMs
W/D is the steel weight / heated perimeter
W/D is 1.88 lb/ft-in, which corresponds to UL X829 values for C1 and C2 of 1.01 and 0.66 respectively.
h is calculated to be approximately 1.8 inches, or 0.030 meters, for a 3 hour rating.
Safety Factor and Cost Savings
Surprisingly, both the insulated and uninsulated W24x162 steel I-beams passed the bedroom
and office design fires. While the uninsulated W24x162 steel I-beam failed the hallway fire design fire,
the insulated beam handily passed. Below is Table # 34, which summarizes the safety factors for the
insulated and uninsulated beams in all three design fires. Also surprising, note that the insulated
W24x162 beams in all three scenarios have very similar safety factors (note, they are shown as the same
due to rounding in this table, but vary slightly).
Table # 36. Safety Factors for Insulated and Uninsulated Beams for the Three Design Fires
Design Fire
Insulated W24x162
Uninsulated W24x162
Bedroom
78% additional
14% additional
moment capacity,
moment capacity,
97% additional deflection
93% additional
adequacy
deflection adequacy
Hallway
78% additional
Failed
moment capacity,
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97% additional
deflection adequacy
Office
78% additional
14% additional
moment capacity,
moment capacity,
97% additional
93% additional
deflection adequacy
deflection adequacy
In terms of cost savings, using uninsulated beams in areas where traveling fires will not be
present is tempting. However, while the uninsulated beams passed the compartment fires using the
Thomas Plot, it should be noted that the 14% additional moment capacity falls below the 20% safety
factor “rule-of-thumb” from Cal Poly FPE 551, and it is recommended that beams should be insulated.
Additional studies through the Margaret Law Time Equivalency Method, Fire Dynamic Simulator, Finite
Element Analysis, etc. may help determine that the safety factor is even larger than it shown here, but
at the current time this report recommends insulation should applied as prescribed by code.
An additional cost savings may be reached by discussing if future, vertical expansions are likely
or not with the owner, tenant, and AHJ, such that the building construction type may be changed from
Type I-A to Type I-B.

Conclusion
The FDS models show that there are potential performance-based design deficiencies for this
project building. However, the scenarios and models made several conservative assumptions that
should be more closely examined with all stakeholders. Most critically, this report assumes that a fire
protection feature is inoperable: the doors are left open from the room with the originating fire—the
office and the bedroom respectively—which allowed smoke to build up in the corridors to a level such
that the tenability limits for occupants were exceeded for visibility, and this. However, it is likely that
these doors would be self-closing, and are a key fire protection feature. The reason the fire models
included open doors are to model a conservative, yet likely scenario. Based on other Cal Poly FPE
presentations and reports, having doors closed to the rooms with the design fires leads to scenarios
where ASET >> RSET. If desired by stakeholders, this scenario with closed doors can also be modeled to
confirm that ASET >> REST for this model as well.
Training may reduce premovement time and allow staff to move patients with one assistant
instead of two. Along that same line of logic, this model assumes all bedrooms and beds are occupied,
and no additional assistants other than the original occupants are available (i.e., no other staff from
other smoke compartments and floors respond. The models may be reexamined and rerun with the
impact of sprinklers to the fire accounted for as well. Finally, the tenability criteria themselves may be
reexamined to see if limits such as that for visibility was set is too conservatively. Overall conclusions
and recommendations for the report are below.

Conclusion and Recommendations
The prescriptive analysis of the Baylor, Scott, & White College Station hospital was overall
satisfactory. A prescriptive analysis of the fire protection engineering aspects of the building, including
egress, fire sprinkler, fire alarm, structural, flammability assessment methods, and smoke control were
conducted and found to be largely compliant with the applicable codes. However, the performancebased design review revealed potential issues that should be further examined. Specifically, there seems
to be an insufficient number of vertical exits in the basement level. Additional vertical exits may in fact
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exist, and are simply not shown on the public floorplans used for this report. The actual number of
vertical exits in the basement should be confirmed.
It is also recommended that additional time and resources be spent with stakeholders discussing
all assumptions and inputs for the fire models. RSET may be decreased through staff training and
preparation. Namely, if doors are left open, it is possible that the required safe egress time will exceed
150% of the available safe egress time of 199.5 seconds, or 300 seconds. This is true of the bedroom fire
scenario, which had an RSET of 260 seconds, in both the noncontrolled and suppression-controlled
cases. It is recommended that door closers be installed on normally occupied rooms. However, as
mentioned early in this report, and as seen in other Cal Poly FPE culminating projects and reports,
design fires modeled with closed doors very likely do not result in a scenario in which RSET exceeds
ASET. Doors were modeled as being open as a very conservative measure, and in order to show It is also
recommended that emphasis and training should be spent on ensuring that staff should understand the
importance of making sure doors are not propped open. Similarly, the structural fire protection was
analyzed for explicit safety, and it is not until uninsulated members in a traveling fire that moment
capacity or deflection adequacy were breached. This is a convergence of events that is highly unlikely to
develop in the field, but this analysis does serve to stress the importance of initial installation and
continuing maintenance of insulation with the management of potentially flammable materials. Finally,
it is an obvious fact that ASET may be increased by the addition of smoke compartments and horizontal
exits, though the cost-benefit of such measures should be weighed against that of the other items
discussed above.
To reiterate, this report is an academic exercise based on limited drawings and information.
Updates and corrections to this report, secondarily for the prescriptive-based analysis but primarily for
the performance-based analysis, are likely if new information becomes available about the Baylor Scott
& White Medical Center in College Station, TX.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Plans and Scaling
The report project building is the Baylor Scott & White Medical Center in College Station, TX.
This facility was built as the Scott & White Hospital at College Station in 2013, and is a 324,070 square
feet, five-story hospital1.
This report uses publicly available floorplans for the Baylor Scott & White Medical Center in
College Station, TX2. These floorplans are shown below in Figures A.1 – A.6.

1
2

http://www.architectmagazine.com/project-gallery/scott-white-hospital-at-college-station
http://www.sw.org/resources/docs/college-station/hospital-floor-map.pdf
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Figure # A.1. Basement Plans
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Figure # A.2. Floor 1 Plans
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Figure # A.3. Floor 2 Plans
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Figure # A.4. Floor 3 Plans
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Figure # A.5. Floor 4 Plans
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Figure # A.6. Floor 5 Plans
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Assuming the floorplans in Figures A.1 – A.6 are to scale, the bottom three floors (including the
basement) are approximately 7.5” x 4”, and the top three floors are approximately 7.5” x 3”. This gives a
floor area of 30 square inches for the bottom three floors, and 22.5 square inches for the top three
floors, with a total floor area of 157.5 square inches.
Equating 157.5 square inches to 324,070 square feet, 157.5 square inches = 324,070 square feet,
or 1 square inch = 2,057.59 square feet. Taking the square root of each, 1 inch = 45.36 feet. Using this
ratio, 3” = 136.08’, 4” = 181.44’, and 7.5” = 340.20’. Using the same ratio, 30 feet = 0.66 inches. This
scale is shown in Figures A.7 – A.12.
To check if these assumptions were reasonable, this report looks at the ICU rooms on Floor 2,
and the Medical Surgical Rooms on Floor 4. This report finds that these rooms are approximately 14.52’
x 14.52’ and 14.52’ x 19.05’ respectively. The doors are 4.54’ wide. This report considers hospital
recommended room dimensions of 10 – 15 square meters (107.64 – 161.46 square feet) and door
widths of 1.25 meters (4.10 feet) listed from a design reference standard from French Red Cross.3 This
report also considers hospital bed dimensions of 38” x 84” from vendors.4 Taking all of this into account,
this report finds that the estimated dimensions are reasonable.

3

https://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/parasismique/croix-rouge-fr-construction-etrehabilitation/Documents/Documentation_technique/Techniques/hopital/Handbook_to_Build_an_Hospital_CRF.p
df
4
https://www.phc-online.com/Hospital_Beds_for_Homes_s/68.htm
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Figure # A.7. Basement Scaling
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Figure # A.8. Floor 1 Scaling
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Figure # A.9. Floor 2 Scaling
233

Figure # A.10. Floor 3 Scaling
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Figure # A.11. Floor 4 Scaling
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Figure # A.12. Floor 5 Scaling
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Appendix B
FDS Code
Below in Figures B.1 – B.4 are views from the PyroSim model that was run as part of the
performance-based design review of this building.
Office

Figure # B.1. Office 3D Model
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Figure # B.2. Enlarged View of Office Fire
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Bedroom

Figure # B.3. Bedroom 3D Model
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Figure # B.4. Enlarged View of Bedroom Fire
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Appendix C
DETACT
The fire model in the report relied on FDS via PyroSim, and Pathfinder. DETACT had also been
considered, but it was decided that PyroSim would yield a more accurate indication of detector
activation. This is because PyroSim and FDS use computational fluid dynamics, versus the correlations
inherent to DETACT. Additionally, the DETACT model relied on several assumptions and simplifications
that were not required for the PyroSim and FDS. Nevertheless, the DETACT model is presented here for
completeness.
Analysis of Fire Detector Response
Fire scenarios and expected response characteristics of fire detection devices installed in the building
In this hospital, the fire scenarios are generally one of two broad categories: rooms and
corridors. This report examines these three fire scenarios and the expected response characteristics of
the fire detection devices installed in the building below.
Note, other models, such as FDS and CFAST, are also useful tools to explore fire detector
responses. For the purposes of this report, they are considered later.
This report uses Method 1, Optical density vs temperature (B.4.8.1) from Annex B of NFPA 72 to
estimate the response characteristics of the fire detection devices installed in the building. This report
uses B.4.7.5.3 and Table B.4.7.5.3, and selected the conservative value of 41.7oC temperature rise (for
wood material) for detector response from Table C.1 below for a photoelectric smoke detector.
Table # C.1. Temperature Rise for Detector Response from NFPA 72-2016

This report takes a worst-case scenario of a fire starting at the maximum distance from a smoke
detector. In a room, this would be in the middle of a 4 x 4 grid of smoke detectors spaced 30’ apart from
each other. In a corridor, this would be between two smoke detectors set 42’ apart. The difference
between these two cases is marginal, with room fires having a radial distance of 6.5, while corridor fires
have a radial distance of 6.4 (the different numbers are due to slight calculation and rounding
differences). Calculations and graphs of different fires are shown below in Tables C.2 – C.6 and Figures
C.1 – C.5.
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Table # C.2. DETACT, Room, Fast Fire
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Figure # C.1. DETACT, Room, Fast Fire
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Table # C.3. DETACT, Corridor, Fast Fire
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Figure # C.2. DETACT, Corridor, Fast Fire
From DETACT, this report compares the response times for a fast fire in a room and a corridor,
and find that a room detector’s response time is slightly slower than that of a corridor detector’s (by
only one or two seconds). In reality, the corridor detector’s likely react even faster, as smoke is
‘channeled’ in one dimension within a corridor, instead of spreading out in two dimensions, along the
plane of a room ceiling. With that information, to be conservative, this report applies slow, medium,
fast, and ultrafast fires to find the following response times for different fires below in Tables C.4 – C.6
and Figures C.3 – C.5. Note, the scaling may change from graph to graph.
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Table # C.4. DETACT, Room, Slow Fire
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Figure # C.3. DETACT, Room, Slow Fire

247

Table # C.5. DETACT, Room, Medium Fire
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Figure # C.4. DETACT, Room, Medium Fire
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Table # C.6. DETACT, Room, Ultrafast Fire
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Figure # C.5. DETACT, Room, Ultrafast Fire
Summary Table
Table C.7 below summarizes the expected response time for the fire detection devices this
report assumed was installed in this building.
Room Fire Type
Slow
Medium
Fast
Ultrafast

Table # C.7. DETACT Response Times
Photoelectric smoke detector response time
524 s
264 s
134 s
48 s

Fire size at the time of detector activation for selected scenarios
Using the same information and graphs as in the previous section above, the fire size at the time
of detector activation for the selected scenarios may be found. The heat release rate at the time of
detector activation for different types of fires is shown below in Table C.8.
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Room Fire Type
Slow
Medium
Fast
Ultrafast

Table # C.8. DETACT Fire HRR
Fire HRR at detector activation time
823.7 kW
836.4 kW
843.9 kW
921.6 kW
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Appendix D
Fire Alarm Sequence of Operation
Table D.1 below describes the sequence of operation for the fire alarm system. Other disciplines
working on this project, including the architect, mechanical engineer-of-record, and electrical engineerof-record should coordinate their systems with this matrix. For example, the HVAC systems
automatically shut down in the event that a fire alarm detection device is activated.
Table # D.1. DETACT Response Times
General
Input vs Output
Alarm
Manual Pull Station
X
Area Detector
X
Duct Detector
X
Elevator Lobby Detector
X
Sprinkler Waterflow Swtich
X
Valve Tamper Switch

Control
Panel
Alarm
X
X
X
X
X

Control
Release
Panel
Elevator Door
Supervisory Recall
Holders
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Close
Fire/Smoke
Dampers
X
X
X
X
X

HVAC
Shutdown
X
X
X
X
X

Additional Notification Devices
The public Baylor, Scott & White Medical Center floorplans used in this report do not include details
such as the building mechanical and electrical systems. Relevant to the fire alarm system, this report
does not know what type of HVAC system is used, and where the associated ductwork is routed. It is
assumed that such a system exists for this hospital, and therefore, besides the area smoke detectors
described in the main body of this report, duct detectors would also be installed in order to monitor the
interior of the ducts for the development of fire and smoke, and to activate the general alarm, close fire
and smoke dampers (FSDs), and shut down HVAC fans. This is necessary to mitigate the movement of
smoke and fire through the HVAC system, especially since HVAC ducts typically cross fire and smoke
barriers, and could otherwise serve as a means to spread fire and products of combustion to spaces
where they would otherwise not be present, and to compromise the tenability criteria of those spaces.

HVAC System Operation
As mentioned above in this Appendix, neither detailed drawings nor information of the HVAC systems is
provided for this project. This report assumes an HVAC system with fans on the roof, and a system of
ductwork that extends to every floor, crossing fire and smoke barriers and connecting the various floors
and smoke compartments in the building. FSDs should be installed wherever ducts cross such a
boundary, to protect what would otherwise be a communicating opening that would allow fire and
products of combustion to cross from one separated space to another.
This building does not require smoke control, so none of the requirements of smoke control (e.g.
emergency power, non-combustible mounting, redundant fan belts, etc.) apply to the HVAC equipment,
and it is not expected to operate during a fire event. This report recommends shutting down the HVAC
system in the event of a fire.
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Appendix E
Structural Fire Protection Calculations
Below in Figures E.1 – E.10 are examples of the calculations run on spreadsheets for the structural fire
protection section of the performance-based review of this building. The calculation for the fire, and for
the insulated and uninsulated structural elements (members) are shown. Note that the bedroom and
office fires share the same fire information for both their respective insulated and uninsulated structural
element (member) analysis, while the hallway fire, as a travel fire, was adjusted for the insulated and
uninsulated cases to find the worst-case scenario for each as a deliberate choice to be conservative in
the modeling of these fires.

t (min)
Q (constant)
147000 kW
TA
20 C
delta t
3s
Q"
5000 kW/m2
H0
3.6 m
X0
36 m
Y0
3.6 m
A
129.6 m2
Percent
0.1
Vs
0.003158 m/s
Ab
12.96 m2
tb
1140 sec
qf
5700 MJ/m2
t_total

12540

0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7

t (s)

x (m) - fire location Lt
0
0
0
3
0.009473684 0.000263
6
0.018947368 0.000526
9
0.028421053 0.000789
12
0.037894737 0.001053
15
0.047368421 0.001316
18
0.056842105 0.001579
21
0.066315789 0.001842
24
0.075789474 0.002105
27
0.085263158 0.002368
30
0.094736842 0.002632
33
0.104210526 0.002895
36
0.113684211 0.003158
39
0.123157895 0.003421
42
0.132631579 0.003684
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700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
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Figure # E.1. Bedroom Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Fire
k
rho
cp
delta x
delta t
S.B
hc
e
Fo
ki
rho_i
cp_i
Fs/Vs
d_i
(half inch)

45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 64.0325789193
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 64.0312194662 20.05287 49,750.72 1,940,277.94 28,928,190.63 0.033511
0.01 meters
0.1
6 64.0298599552 20.10573 49,749.91 1,940,246.57 28,927,954.49 0.033511
3 seconds
0.15
9 64.0285003865 20.15858 49,749.11 1,940,215.17 28,927,718.19 0.033512
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 64.0271407599 20.21144 49,748.30 1,940,183.76 28,927,481.72 0.033512
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 64.0257810755 20.26429 49,747.50 1,940,152.33 28,927,245.08 0.033512
1
0.3
18 64.0244213333 20.31713 49,746.69 1,940,120.88 28,927,008.28 0.033512
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 64.0230615330 20.36997 49,745.88 1,940,089.40 28,926,771.31 0.033513
0.4
24 64.0217016749 20.42281 49,745.07 1,940,057.91 28,926,534.19 0.033513
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 64.0203417588 20.47564 49,744.27 1,940,026.41 28,926,296.89 0.033513
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 64.0189817847 20.52847 49,743.46 1,939,994.88 28,926,059.43 0.033514
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 64.0176217526 20.5813 49,742.65 1,939,963.33 28,925,821.81 0.033514
0.6
36 64.0162616624 20.63412 49,741.84 1,939,931.76 28,925,584.03 0.033514
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 64.0149015141 20.68693 49,741.03 1,939,900.18 28,925,346.08 0.033514
0.7
42 64.0135413077 20.73975 49,740.22 1,939,868.57 28,925,107.97 0.033515
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 64.0121810432 20.79256 49,739.41 1,939,836.95 28,924,869.70 0.033515
0.8
48 64.0108207205 20.84536 49,738.60 1,939,805.30 28,924,631.26 0.033515
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Figure # E.2. Bedroom Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Insulated Member
k
rho
cp
delta x
delta t
S.B
hc
e
Fo
ki
rho_i
cp_i
Fs/Vs
d_i
(half inch)

45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 64.0325789193
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 63.9996303822 21.2795 49,731.91 1,939,544.34 28,922,664.10 0.033517
0.01 meters
0.1
6 63.9666023114 22.55834 49,711.98 1,938,767.32 28,916,799.40 0.033524
3 seconds
0.15
9 63.9334940582 23.83652 49,691.76 1,937,978.60 28,910,835.18 0.033531
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 63.9003049732 25.11403 49,671.24 1,937,178.50 28,904,773.83 0.033538
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 63.8670344071 26.39089 49,650.44 1,936,367.32 28,898,617.56 0.033545
1
0.3
18 63.8336817101 27.66708 49,629.37 1,935,545.34 28,892,368.36 0.033553
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 63.8002462323 28.9426 49,608.02 1,934,712.80 28,886,028.08 0.03356
0.4
24 63.7667273238 30.21746 49,586.41 1,933,869.93 28,879,598.42 0.033567
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 63.7331243342 31.49164 49,564.54 1,933,016.96 28,873,080.93 0.033575
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 63.6994366133 32.76515 49,542.41 1,932,154.08 28,866,477.10 0.033583
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 63.6656635108
34.038 49,520.04 1,931,281.48 28,859,788.25 0.033591
0.6
36 63.6318043762 35.31016 49,497.42 1,930,399.33 28,853,015.67 0.033598
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 63.5978585591 36.58165 49,474.56 1,929,507.80 28,846,160.54 0.033606
0.7
42 63.5638254091 37.85246 49,451.46 1,928,607.04 28,839,223.95 0.033614
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 63.5297042759 39.12259 49,428.13 1,927,697.20 28,832,206.96 0.033623
0.8
48 63.4954945092 40.39204 49,404.57 1,926,778.41 28,825,110.54 0.033631

Figure # E.3. Bedroom Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Uninsulated Member
t (min)
Q (constant)
147000 kW
TA
20 C
delta t
3s
Q"
5000 kW/m2
H0
3.6 m
X0
36 m
Y0
3.6 m
A
129.6 m2
Percent
0.1
Vs
0.003158 m/s
Ab
12.96 m2
tb
1140 sec
qf
5700 MJ/m2
t_total

12540

0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7

t (s)
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
42

x (m) - fire location Lt
0
0
0.009473684 0.000263
0.018947368 0.000526
0.028421053 0.000789
0.037894737 0.001053
0.047368421 0.001316
0.056842105 0.001579
0.066315789 0.001842
0.075789474 0.002105
0.085263158 0.002368
0.094736842 0.002632
0.104210526 0.002895
0.113684211 0.003158
0.123157895 0.003421
0.132631579 0.003684

Figure # E.4. Hallway Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Fire for Insulated Member
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22
20
25.85403
29.29402
32.18036
34.75758
37.12711
39.34345
41.44014
43.43966
45.35803
47.20715
48.99617
50.73233
52.42147
54.0684

k
rho
cp
delta x
delta t
S.B
hc
e
Fo
ki
rho_i
cp_i
Fs/Vs
d_i
(half inch)

45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 0.0000000000
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 0.1515435955
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
0.01 meters
0.1
6 0.2415505282 20.00046 49,751.51 1,940,309.02 28,928,424.58 0.033511
3 seconds
0.15
9 0.3176299713 20.00118 49,751.50 1,940,308.60 28,928,421.35 0.033511
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 0.3859998768 20.00212 49,751.49 1,940,308.04 28,928,417.13 0.033511
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 0.4492310867 20.00327 49,751.47 1,940,307.36 28,928,412.01 0.033511
1
0.3
18 0.5087004981 20.0046 49,751.45 1,940,306.57 28,928,406.07 0.033511
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 0.5652533569 20.00611 49,751.43 1,940,305.67 28,928,399.36 0.033511
0.4
24 0.6194551686 20.00777 49,751.40 1,940,304.69 28,928,391.92 0.033511
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 0.6717075478 20.00959 49,751.37 1,940,303.61 28,928,383.79 0.033511
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 0.7223085389 20.01157 49,751.34 1,940,302.44 28,928,375.00 0.033511
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 0.7714869331 20.01368 49,751.31 1,940,301.18 28,928,365.56 0.033511
0.6
36 0.8194231392 20.01593 49,751.28 1,940,299.85 28,928,355.51 0.033511
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 0.8662625566 20.01832 49,751.24 1,940,298.43 28,928,344.85 0.033511
0.7
42 0.9121245137 20.02084 49,751.20 1,940,296.94 28,928,333.61 0.033511
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 0.9571084521 20.02349 49,751.16 1,940,295.37 28,928,321.79 0.033511
0.8
48 1.0012983326 20.02626 49,751.12 1,940,293.72 28,928,309.42 0.033511

Figure # E.5. Hallway Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Insulated Member
t (min)
Q (constant)
147000 kW
TA
20 C
delta t
3s
Q"
5000 kW/m2
H0
3.6 m
X0
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Y0
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A
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Percent
0.1
Vs
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tb
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qf
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t_total
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0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7

t (s)

x (m) - fire location Lt
0
0
0
3
0.009473684 0.000263
6
0.018947368 0.000526
9
0.028421053 0.000789
12
0.037894737 0.001053
15
0.047368421 0.001316
18
0.056842105 0.001579
21
0.066315789 0.001842
24
0.075789474 0.002105
27
0.085263158 0.002368
30
0.094736842 0.002632
33
0.104210526 0.002895
36
0.113684211 0.003158
39
0.123157895 0.003421
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0.132631579 0.003684

Figure # E.6. Hallway Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Fire for Uninsulated Member
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45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 290.2179536548
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 290.0678407416 25.79913 49,660.12 1,936,744.67 28,901,482.76 0.033542
0.01 meters
0.1
6 289.9157619872 31.59526 49,562.75 1,932,947.14 28,872,546.97 0.033576
3 seconds
0.15
9 289.7616416959 37.38835 49,459.93 1,928,937.12 28,841,767.07 0.033611
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 289.6054029882 43.17836 49,352.03 1,924,729.25 28,809,246.72 0.033649
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 289.4469678181 48.96525 49,239.35 1,920,334.55 28,775,061.90 0.033689
1
0.3
18 289.2862569906 54.74897 49,122.09 1,915,761.61 28,739,269.97 0.033731
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 289.1231901795 60.52948 49,000.44 1,911,017.29 28,701,915.02 0.033775
0.4
24 288.9576859460 66.30673 48,874.54 1,906,107.21 28,663,031.36 0.033821
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 288.7896617580 72.08068 48,744.51 1,901,036.01 28,622,645.76 0.033869
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 288.6190340096 77.85127 48,610.45 1,895,807.58 28,580,779.07 0.033918
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 288.4457180419 83.61844 48,472.44 1,890,425.21 28,537,447.39 0.03397
0.6
36 288.2696281638 89.38216 48,330.56 1,884,891.71 28,492,662.92 0.034023
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 288.0906776737 95.14236 48,184.86 1,879,209.48 28,446,434.57 0.034079
0.7
42 287.9087788822 100.899 48,035.40 1,873,380.58 28,398,768.50 0.034136
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 287.7238431347 106.652 47,882.23 1,867,406.81 28,349,668.47 0.034195
0.8
48 287.5357808359 112.4013 47,725.38 1,861,289.69 28,299,136.19 0.034256

Figure # E.7. Hallway Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Uninsulated Member
t (min)
Q (constant)
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0.037894737 0.001053
15
0.047368421 0.001316
18
0.056842105 0.001579
21
0.066315789 0.001842
24
0.075789474 0.002105
27
0.085263158 0.002368
30
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Figure # E.8. Office Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Fire
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45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 64.0325789193
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 64.0312194662 20.05287 49,750.72 1,940,277.94 28,928,190.63 0.033511
0.01 meters
0.1
6 64.0298599552 20.10573 49,749.91 1,940,246.57 28,927,954.49 0.033511
3 seconds
0.15
9 64.0285003865 20.15858 49,749.11 1,940,215.17 28,927,718.19 0.033512
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 64.0271407599 20.21144 49,748.30 1,940,183.76 28,927,481.72 0.033512
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 64.0257810755 20.26429 49,747.50 1,940,152.33 28,927,245.08 0.033512
1
0.3
18 64.0244213333 20.31713 49,746.69 1,940,120.88 28,927,008.28 0.033512
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 64.0230615330 20.36997 49,745.88 1,940,089.40 28,926,771.31 0.033513
0.4
24 64.0217016749 20.42281 49,745.07 1,940,057.91 28,926,534.19 0.033513
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 64.0203417588 20.47564 49,744.27 1,940,026.41 28,926,296.89 0.033513
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 64.0189817847 20.52847 49,743.46 1,939,994.88 28,926,059.43 0.033514
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 64.0176217526 20.5813 49,742.65 1,939,963.33 28,925,821.81 0.033514
0.6
36 64.0162616624 20.63412 49,741.84 1,939,931.76 28,925,584.03 0.033514
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 64.0149015141 20.68693 49,741.03 1,939,900.18 28,925,346.08 0.033514
0.7
42 64.0135413077 20.73975 49,740.22 1,939,868.57 28,925,107.97 0.033515
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 64.0121810432 20.79256 49,739.41 1,939,836.95 28,924,869.70 0.033515
0.8
48 64.0108207205 20.84536 49,738.60 1,939,805.30 28,924,631.26 0.033515

Figure # E.9. Office Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Insulated Member
k
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45.8 W/mK
time[min] time[s] q"net[kW/m2] Temp S f_y,steel M_n
E_steel
delta_max
7850 kg/m3
0
0 64.0325789193
20 49,751.52 1,940,309.29 28,928,426.61 0.033511
460 J/kgK
0.05
3 63.9996303822 21.2795 49,731.91 1,939,544.34 28,922,664.10 0.033517
0.01 meters
0.1
6 63.9666023114 22.55834 49,711.98 1,938,767.32 28,916,799.40 0.033524
3 seconds
0.15
9 63.9334940582 23.83652 49,691.76 1,937,978.60 28,910,835.18 0.033531
5.67E-08 W/m2K4
0.2
12 63.9003049732 25.11403 49,671.24 1,937,178.50 28,904,773.83 0.033538
20 W/m2K
0.25
15 63.8670344071 26.39089 49,650.44 1,936,367.32 28,898,617.56 0.033545
1
0.3
18 63.8336817101 27.66708 49,629.37 1,935,545.34 28,892,368.36 0.033553
0.380504016 < 1/2
0.35
21 63.8002462323 28.9426 49,608.02 1,934,712.80 28,886,028.08 0.03356
0.4
24 63.7667273238 30.21746 49,586.41 1,933,869.93 28,879,598.42 0.033567
0.12 W/mK
0.45
27 63.7331243342 31.49164 49,564.54 1,933,016.96 28,873,080.93 0.033575
300 kg/m3
0.5
30 63.6994366133 32.76515 49,542.41 1,932,154.08 28,866,477.10 0.033583
1200 J/kgK
0.55
33 63.6656635108
34.038 49,520.04 1,931,281.48 28,859,788.25 0.033591
0.6
36 63.6318043762 35.31016 49,497.42 1,930,399.33 28,853,015.67 0.033598
24.05163897 m^-1
0.65
39 63.5978585591 36.58165 49,474.56 1,929,507.80 28,846,160.54 0.033606
0.7
42 63.5638254091 37.85246 49,451.46 1,928,607.04 28,839,223.95 0.033614
0.029779584 m
0.75
45 63.5297042759 39.12259 49,428.13 1,927,697.20 28,832,206.96 0.033623
0.8
48 63.4954945092 40.39204 49,404.57 1,926,778.41 28,825,110.54 0.033631

Figure # E.10. Office Structural Fire Protection Calculations, Uninsulated Member
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